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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the need for a multilateral regime for the regulation of foreign
direct investment. The absence of such a regime has slowed the growth of foreign direct
investment, as investment decisions are difficult to make because of the uncertainty of
investment rules. Attempts to establish a multilateral framework for investment have
failed due to disagreement between developed and developing countries on its scope.
The major source of controversy has been the inclusion of the national treatment
standard in the prospective agreement.
This thesis analyses the position of both sides, and attempts to find a balance between the
positive and negative effects of the multilateral framework for regulating foreign direct
investment. It argues that an investment regime modelled after the General Agreement
on Trade in Services could be beneficial, as it would provide security for investment, and
flexibility for host countries to control the inflow of foreign investment.
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CHAPTER 1:
A.

INTRODUCTION

Background:

According to Nicholas DiMascio and Joost Pauwelyn, international trade involves the
movement of goods or services across borders, while investment refers to the movement
of capital and other factors of production. They are of the opinion that “companies trade
to supply their foreign investments; they invest to facilitate and diversify their trade”. 1
The momentous expansion of foreign direct investment over the years may be ascribed to
increased trade, service and investment liberalization goals provided by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) which was established in 1995. However, unlike sectors such as
trade and services, no comprehensive framework for the regulation of foreign direct
investment exists, despite many efforts to establish such a framework.2 In 1996, the
WTO set up a working group to examine the relationship between trade and investment
at the Singapore Ministerial Meeting.3 One of the purposes of the working group was to
set out a basis for the negotiation of a multilateral framework for investment.
1

Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, “Non-discrimination in Trade and Investment
Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?” (2008) 102 Am J Int’l L 4889, online: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40007768>.

2

The first attempt was the foreign investment provisions in the Havana Charter (1948),
which did not come to fruition due to the objection to the provisions by business groups
and the refusal of the United States to participate in establishing the organization. Other
attempts will be discussed in the next chapter of this thesis.

3

The World Trade Organization, Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and
Investment, online: The World Trade Organization, online: World Trade Organization
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_e.htm>.
1

At the 2001 Ministerial Conference held in Qatar,4 members of the WTO decided to
commence negotiations on a multilateral framework on investment if an agreement on
the procedures of such negotiations could be reached at the Cancun Ministerial Meeting
in 2003.5 Proponents of a multilateral framework on investment were mainly from
developed countries, particularly the European Community6 and the United States, which
advocated for the need to secure, protect and liberalize foreign investment and, wanted
the inclusion of the national treatment standard in the agreement. Developed countries
argued at the Doha meeting that including a national treatment standard in a multilateral
framework for investment would increase the growth of foreign direct investment and
lead to the harmonisation of investment rules. They argued that it would also ensure the
protection, predictability and transparency of foreign direct investment transactions.7
However, developing countries, such as India, opposed the commencement of such a
negotiation on the ground that it may result in their loss of control over foreign direct
4

This is often referred to as the Doha Development Round (Doha) in this thesis.

5

WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, (14 November
2001) 41 ILM 746 at 749, online:
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm>.
[Hereinafter referred to as Doha].

6

The European Community is an economic and political union of 27 member states
which are located mostly in Europe. The European Community aims to ensure the free
movement of goods, services and capital and tries to maintain common trade policies
through the formulation and implementation of external trade policies negotiated on
behalf of member states.

7

WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 5 at 749.
2

investment activities within their jurisdictions. Furthermore, such a framework, if it
included the national treatment standard, would prohibit the use of investment
restrictions, as practised by developing countries, to help in controlling the inflow of
foreign direct investment.8 The inability of both sides to reach a compromise on the
scope of the multilateral framework for investment led to its suspension from the Doha
discussions in 2004.9
The plethora of bilateral and regional investment treaties10 make investment decisions
difficult due to uncertainty in investment rules.11 The fact that no multilateral agreements

8

Restrictions may include: restrictions on the importation of certain equipments
necessary for service delivery, stringent screening procedures and the imposition of
heavy tax duties on foreign investors. See Mary Footer, “The International Regulation
of Trade in Services following Completion of the Uruguay Round” (1995) 29 Int’l L
453.

9

It is important to note that no formal discussions on the subject have been entertained at
the WTO since 2004 and the activities of the Working Group has been set up by the
WTO have been suspended.

10

Examples of such agreements include North American Free Trade Agreement Between
the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico and the Government of the
United States of America, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2, 32 ILM 289; the
Energy Charter Treaty, 17 December 1994, 34 ILM 381; General Agreement on Trade
in Services, 15 April 1994, 33 ILM 1167; Consolidated version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 2007, 31 ILM 247; United StatesMorocco Free Trade Agreement, 16 June 2004 44 ILM 544; Dominican RepublicCentral America-United States Free Trade Agreement 28 May 2004, 43 ILM 514.
3

exist is due to divergent approaches to the problem of foreign investment protection and
the existence of competing investment agreements regarding the treatment of foreign
investment.12 One of the contentious issues regarding the need for a multilateral
framework on investment is the scope of foreign direct investment obligations under
such an agreement. The concern in this regard is the extent to which such a multilateral
agreement would expand the scope of WTO obligations on trade and services to include
investment. This was a cause of worry because such an expansion may lead to
international interference with domestic rights to regulate the inflow of foreign direct
investment. This likelihood of encroachment on sovereignty was a subject of
apprehension, particularly for developing countries. These debates have been the centre
of previous unsuccessful attempts to establish a multilateral framework for investment.
An example is the unsuccessful attempt to create a Multilateral Agreement on

11

The volume of investment treaties signed among various countries and subsequent
amendments to those treaties make it difficult to keep track of investment rules.
Furthermore, a potential foreign investor may face difficulties where there is no
existing investment treaty between it and the country it intends to invest. This
demonstrates the need for a multilateral framework for investment.

12

M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (New York: Cambridge

University Press, Grotius Publications, 1994) 269.The various bilateral and multilateral
investment treaties have different provisions for the treatment of foreign direct
investment. An example is the NAFTA which provides for pre-entry and post-entry
national treatment obligation while the General Agreement on Trade in Services
operating under the auspices of the WTO, only provides for post-entry national
treatment.
4

Investment under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development13
(OECD) framework in 1995. The inability of members to reach a consensus on the
content of the proposed agreement led to its failure. One of the contending issues was the
insertion of the national treatment standard in the agreement which the European
Community opposed.14 The WTO has been the most recent forum for negotiations on the
multilateral framework for foreign investment.
The disagreement over the issue has been between developed and developing countries.
As noted above, a major point of controversy underlying the debate relating to a
multilateral framework on investment is the inclusion of a national treatment standard in
the agreement. The national treatment standard is set out in the General Agreement on
Trade in Services15 (GATS). The GATS provides for the non-discrimination principle
which is made up of two major components: the most favoured nation principle and the
national treatment standard. GATS regulates trade in services through two sets of
obligations: general obligations and specific obligations.

13

The OECD consists of thirty-four member countries from Europe, North and Latin

America and the Pacific with a commitment to democratic government providing a
forum to discuss and develop issues relating to social and economic policies of its
members.
14

Further discussions on this issue are made in the next chapter of this thesis.

15

General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 183, 33 ILM

1167 [GATS]. The GATS builds on the core foundations of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 187 [GATT].
5

The most favoured nation principle restrains members from granting preferences to
certain members while excluding others. All members have the most favoured nation
status because it is a general obligation therefore, members are entitled to any condition
of trade or service granted to another member, whether favourable in nature or not.
General obligation applies to all measures affecting trade in services and is referred to as
the “top-down” approach because it permits members to list exemptions to its
application.16
The national treatment standard is similar to the most favoured nation principle, and is
set out in Article XVII of the GATS. It stipulates that each Member of the WTO shall
accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, treatment no less
favourable than it accords to its own like services and service suppliers. 17 The national
treatment standard as stated above prevents discrimination and ensures equal competition
between foreign and domestic goods and investment in services. The national treatment
standard is a specific obligation which applies to only those sectors that a member has

16

David P Fidler & GATS Legal Review Team for the World Health Organization,

Legal Review of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) from a Health
Policy Perspective, Globalization, Trade and Health Working Papers Series, online:
<http://whqlibdoc.who.int/gats/GATS_Legal_Review_eng.pdf>.
17

GATS, supra note 15 at article XVII; see also the Report of Panel on China –

Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications
and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R (2009),
online:<http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanels/chinapublications(panel).pdf>.
6

committed to in its schedule. This approach is known as the bottom-up approach.18 The
flexibility provided by GATS allows countries to restrict foreign direct investment in
certain sectors of their economies.
The national treatment standard as provided in the GATS states that WTO members are
not permitted to grant investment incentives or place any form of investment restrictions
within their countries which operate to the disadvantage of foreign investors. Developing
countries fear that the imposing the national treatment standard may stall the growth of
domestic companies because they have to compete with multinationals on an equal
playing field. This is viewed as unfair because most multinational corporations have
huge capital, competitive brand names, technical knowledge and skilled manpower
which domestic companies may not possess.
Developed countries also preserve their policy objectives in terms of the need to control
foreign investment so as to prevent excessive foreign domination over their economic
activities. They do this by means of the various restrictions on foreign direct investment
created to protect their economies. An example is the Investment Canada Act19 which
regulates foreign investment in Canada. The purpose of the Act is “to provide for the
review of significant investments in Canada by non-Canadians in a manner that
encourages investment, economic growth and employment opportunities in Canada and
to provide for the review of investments in Canada by non-Canadians that could be
18

M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (New York: Cambridge

University Press, Grotius Publications, 1994) 269 at 300.
19

Investment Canada Act RSC, 1985, c 28 (1st Supp).
7

injurious to national security”.20 The Act provides for screening foreign direct
investment by placing several value thresholds that trigger national security review under
the Act with respect to investments by non-Canadians.21
This thesis expresses the view that the multilateral framework on investment is necessary
to protect investment and to ensure predictability in the regulation of foreign direct
investment, however, it is essential to consider the negative effects it could have on the
economy of members of the WTO if a one-size-fits-all approach is employed in doing so.
Members of the WTO are at different stages of economic development22 and this, to a
large extent, determines the level of foreign direct investment each one could embrace
depending on its policy needs. Hence, some developing countries, such as those of
Africa, need to retain control over the flow of foreign direct investment to ensure that
domestic policy objectives and developmental growth are promoted.

20

Ibid at preamble.

21

Michael Holden &Library of Parliament- Parliamentary Information and Research

Service, The Foreign Direct Investment Review Process in Canada and other Countries
(Ottawa: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, 2007). For more readings on
the Investment Canada Act see <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/icalic.nsf/eng/home?OpenDocument>.
22

The impact of expanding the scope of obligations under the proposed multilateral
framework for investment will be different for each country depending on the level of
development it is at.
8

Also, it argues that a potential multilateral framework on investment could provide
comprehensive and harmonized international investment standards, however the
advantages are accompanied by potentially disadvantageous implications. It is the scope
and effect of such an agreement that will determine what may be the more favourable
approach for developing countries.
The thesis argues that the scope of obligations provided under a multilateral framework
for investment should ensure a balance between the positive and negative impacts of the
agreement. This may be achieved by granting host states the flexibility to determine
which obligations to be bound by. For instance, as in the GATS example, the national
treatment standard should not be made a mandatory obligation but rather, a specific
obligation which members of the WTO may choose to be bound. This approach may
make a multilateral investment agreement more acceptable to opposing states,
particularly developing countries. An example of such an agreement is the GATS which
ensures the liberalization of trade in services by securing a balance of rights and
obligations, while giving due respect to national policy objectives,23 achieved through its
Schedule of Specific Commitments.24 This schedule permits members to determine the
level of liberalization they wish to embrace, by choosing sectors of their economies to
which the national treatment and market access would apply. This provision allows for
the necessary flexibility that may be desired by host states.

23

GATS, supra note 15 at preamble.

24

GATS, supra note 15 at article XX.
9

To this end, the thesis proposes that the national treatment standard should be included in
the multilateral framework for investment in the format adopted under the GATS to
allow for flexibility in the control of foreign direct investment by each WTO member.
B.

Thesis Statement

This thesis focuses on the national treatment standard. It assesses the scope of the
national treatment standard under GATS and argues that the scope should be maintained,
and included in the proposed multilateral framework for foreign direct investment,
considering the dynamic nature of investment.
A similar national treatment standard is provided in most bilateral and regional
agreements and is to be observed at the post-establishment stage of foreign direct
investment. However, its effect on a multilateral framework must be considered on its
own merits, particularly the call to expand it to the pre-establishment phase of foreign
direct investment.
This thesis examines how the inclusion of the national treatment standard in a
multilateral framework for investment affects the economic development of developing
countries, and argues that it should only be applied at the post-investment stage, giving
room for flexibility as inherent in the GATS.25 Consequently, the scope of the national
treatment standard should not be expanded beyond what it is under the GATS.
The analysis leads to the following proposition:

25

The Schedule of Commitments under GATS, as stated above, provides the necessary

flexibility in adhering to GATS’ obligations.
10

The national treatment standard should be included in the
multilateral framework for investment but its scope should
be limited to specific economic sectors, to which members
permit its application as inherent in GATS, in order to
balance its positive and negative effects on the economies
of developing countries.
However, before a framework can be evaluated, it is necessary to understand the scope
of existing foreign direct investment obligations under the WTO. One of the foreign
direct investment obligations of member states of the WTO is the non-discrimination
principle which is provided in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)26,
GATS27, the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)28 and the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).29 The
principle has also been a major source of disagreement between developing and
developed countries in the negotiations for a multilateral framework for investment. The
following chapters of this thesis will discuss the role of the non-discrimination principle
in the regulation of foreign direct investment and how its benefits can be harnessed to
outweigh its disadvantages.
26

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 15 April1994, 1867 UNTS 187.

27

GATS, supra note 15.

28

Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, 15 April 1994, 1868 UNTS 186.
[TRIMs Agreement].

29

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1197 [TRIPS]. Further discussions on these Agreements will be provided
in the next chapter.
11

C.

Overview of Chapters

This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter, the present chapter, is
introductory in nature, and provides a brief summary of the entire thesis as set out above.
Chapter Two provides a historical background to the development of the law of foreign
direct investment, the national treatment standard and non-discrimination principle. It
outlines the several efforts in the WTO to create a multilateral framework for investment
and the factors that contributed to their failures. Chapter Three discusses the role of the
non-discrimination principle under the WTO in the regulation of foreign direct
investment. It analyzes the opinions of developed and developing countries at the Doha
negotiations, how the views of both sides on the establishment of a multilateral
framework for investment impact the economic growth of host states, and how it
provides security for the interests of foreign investors.
Chapter Four assesses the operation and scope of the GATS obligations regarding
foreign direct investment. It analyzes the benefits of the GATS, and demonstrates that it
is a workable model for the multilateral framework for investment because it provides
flexibility for host states to control their economic growth through its Schedule of
Specific Commitments. This Schedule permits members to accept or refuse to be bound
by national treatment standard in certain areas of their economies. This chapter
concludes that a multilateral framework for investment designed along the lines of
GATS, would lead to an acceptable compromise between developed and developing
countries which would result in the establishment of a multilateral framework for
investment. Chapter Five provides a general conclusion and makes recommendations
based on the analysis provided in chapters 2 to 4.
12

D.

METHODOLOGY30

In an attempt to provide answers to the research question, several research
methodologies including the doctrinal, historical, comparative and interdisciplinary
methods of research will be used.
1.1

Research Methodology

This thesis is essentially doctrinal in nature. It utilizes the descriptive, theoretical, critical
and analytical methods of doctrinal research in addressing the research questions raised.
Doctrinal scholarship is employed to discuss the task of the WTO in regulating foreign
direct investment. It is used to analyze the scope and nature of obligations of member
states of the WTO regarding the regulation of foreign direct investment in view of the
WTO’s principle of non-discrimination. The doctrinal approach will assist the
assessment of negotiations at Doha Development Round31 (Doha) on the need for an
increase in the scope of foreign direct investment obligations.
Another research tool used in the thesis is the historical approach. As outlined above,
several attempts to create a multilateral framework for foreign investment have been
unsuccessful. A historical perspective is essential to trace the endeavours made to create
a multilateral framework for foreign direct investment and the factors responsible for

30

Some parts of this section were discussed in my Methodological Prospectus which was

submitted this term to Professor Sheila Wildeman, 17 February 2011 (Schulich School
of Law, Dalhousie University).
31

The Doha development round (Doha) is the current trade negotiations in the WTO

which positions development as its core objective.
13

their failures. The historical methodology is used to investigate if the problems of the
past are still present in current deliberations at Doha. An understanding of this helps to
contextualize recommendations that may facilitate the avoidance of past pitfalls. The
required historical information will be obtained from secondary materials such as
textbooks, articles and reports.
The comparative approach is also employed in this thesis. This approach seeks to
“compare two or more things with a view to discovering something about one or all of
the things being compared”.32 Since there are two perspectives to the altercations on the
subject matter of concluding a multilateral framework for foreign investment,
namely, developed and developing country perspectives, a comparative analysis of both
viewpoints is required in order to find a solution to the standoff. A solution may be found
through an analysis of both viewpoints and in balancing them to find a compromise that
may be satisfactory to both developing and developed countries.
This thesis is interdisciplinary and broaches on some subject matters in law, economics,
politics and international relations. Interdisciplinary research entails the study of a
subject other than law and using this knowledge for legal analysis to arrive at legal
conclusions. Aside from law, the thesis is linked with economics and politics therefore,
an understanding of economics is required in this thesis. The economic aspect of this
thesis relates to the operation and effects of foreign investments. Also, in an attempt to
provide a solution to the research question on the impact of a multilateral framework for
foreign investment on developing countries, an understanding of the legal, economic and
32

Wikipedia, online: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparative_research.
14

political effects of a multilateral framework for foreign investment on economic
development is necessary. Furthermore, an economic analysis of the arguments for and
against a multilateral framework for foreign investment is needed to fully appreciate the
discrepancy between developing and developed countries and, hopefully provide
solutions which take into account the economic and political consequences apprehended
by both sides. The study of secondary materials on the subject such as books, articles and
online sources may provide the required information.
1.2

Description of Terms

This thesis recognizes the fact that there are economic complexities in describing
developed and developing countries. The ever changing nature of economies makes this
broad categorization of countries as developed and developing difficult. Therefore, this
thesis limits its discussion of developed countries to the European Community, the US,
Canada, and Japan. On the other hand, developing countries for the purpose of this thesis
refers to slowly developing countries in Africa, Asia, South and North America. Also,
this thesis acknowledges that the global financial collapse of 2008 may have varied the
perspectives of both developed and developing countries on the need for a multilateral
framework for investment, and the inclusion of the national treatment standard therein.
However, this thesis does not delve into such variations and its discussions are limited to
positions taken by both sides at the Doha Ministerial meeting which commenced in
2001.
The word “developed countries” may be used interchangeably with “industrialised
nations”. “Host state” refers to the recipient of foreign direct investment which is the
15

domestic country while “home state” refers to the country of the foreign investor who
seeks to make foreign direct investment.
“State” is used interchangeably with “country”.
1.3

Scholarly Significance

This thesis analyzes contentious issues underlying the increasing demand for a
multilateral framework for investment. The national treatment standard is an important
subject in this controversy and arguments in support of its inclusion in a multilateral
framework for foreign investment have led debates between the developed countries, and
between developed and developing countries. Scholars have provided literature and
given opinions, for, and against the conclusion of the multilateral framework for foreign
investment. This thesis is significant because it analyzes the advantages and
disadvantages of including the national treatment standard in a multilateral framework
for foreign investment and hopefully, provides a balanced solution that may be useful for
future WTO negotiations on the subject.
Despite the fact that negotiations on a multilateral framework for foreign investment
were suspended at the WTO in 2004, and no formal discussions or Working Group on
the subject have been set up at the WTO since then, scholars like Donatella
Alessandrini33 have continued in their research on the topic. Members of the WTO
continue to engage in foreign direct investment, and its growth has contributed to
33

Donatella Alessandrini, Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trade Regime:

The Failure and Promise of the WTO’s Development Mission (Oxford: Hart Publishing
Limited, 2010) 1.
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economic development, hence, the subject of its regulation will continue to surface in the
future WTO negotiations. This research is a preparation for such re-emergence, as it
hopes to provide some recommendations to assist in navigating the way to an acceptable
agreement for all interested parties.
This thesis serves as a catalyst for further research, particularly in relation to finding a
balanced solution acceptable to member states of the WTO, and adds to the wealth of
scholarship in international trade law.
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CHAPTER 2:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE REGULATION OF

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
INTRODUCTION
Trade has been in existence for as long as humanity and constitutes an essential means of
livelihood. In the days of our ancestors, trade was used to access scarce goods, skills and
merchandise. Most communities explored their natural resources, and specialised in the
production of goods which were later traded or exchanged with neighbouring
communities for goods they lacked. The increase of the population of communities and
the emergence of new communities resulted in increased trade activities. Thus, trade soon
became a means of not only economic growth, but also an attribute of power due to the
increased wealth it generated for communities and later States. Ancient Greece, for
example, relied heavily on the trade of silver and oil in the Mediterranean region for
economic growth.1 Trade contributed significantly to the transition from the ancient to the
modern world.2
Trade became more than a means for economic survival, it grew into a source of
economic wealth which made self-sufficient trading countries powerful and influential.
States increased their wealth and power through amplified export activities and minimal
imports. This strategy facilitated economic growth and development in host states as it

1

Gilbert R Winham, “The Evolution of the World Trading System – The Economic and
Policy Context” in DL Bethlehem et al, Oxford Handbook of International Trade Law
(Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2009. ) 1 at 7.

2

Ibid.
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encouraged host states, to maximise their natural and agricultural resources which
resulted in economic wealth, gained through export activities. Host states were able to
minimize their import activities by their basic needs producing locally. Over time, trade
development inspired states to expand their activities beyond their neighbouring
communities to other parts of the globe, leading to increased export and import activities
and, eventually to colonialism.3
The expansion of trade necessitated some form of regulation to ensure stability and
progress in commercial and related economic activity. Trade regulation was introduced
by political leaders for the purposes of collecting taxes, tolls, tariffs and to impose nontariff restrictions4 on foreign traders.5 These measures generated revenue for governments
and were, and continue to be used today to protect the domestic traders from foreign
competition and bolster the import/export balance. This practice, often referred to as
protectionism, led to restrained trade between states, as stringent measures were applied

3

Winham, supra note 1at 8.

4

Non-tariff measures include restrictive import quota, restrictive licensing, packaging
and labelling conditions and rules of origin. See M Ferrantino & OECD, Quantifying
the Trade and Economic Effects of Non-Tariff Measures, OECD Trade Policy Working
Paper No 28, Doc No doi:10.1787/837654407568 (2006), online: OECD
<http://tradefacilitation.free.fr/download/Trade/Quantifying%20the%20Trade%20and%
20Economic%20Effects%20of%20Non-Tariff%20Measures%20OECD%202006.pdf>.

5

Winham, supra note 1 at 7.
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to discourage imports and to promote economic development. 6 Attempts were made to
promote trade through trade liberalization mechanisms because protectionist practices
were slowing down trade activities.7 Such mechanisms are provided, for instance, in the
1947 GATT,8 which required states to reduce trade tariffs and other trade barriers,
including the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade.
At the global level, the conclusion of World War II inspired the emergence of schemes
intended to restructure the post-war economy.9 As well, those states that had no longer
had colonies traded and invested in former colonies and in other foreign states, especially
through the mechanics of foreign direct investment.10 The end of World War II saw the
emergence of colonies into independent states. The new states sought to protect and
regain control over their natural resources that had formerly been under the control of

6

Alan O Sykest, “Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade” (1999)
66:1 University of Chicago Law Review at 1-46.

7

For further readings see Winham, supra note 1 at 1-12.

8

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, Can TS 1947No 27
[GATT].

9

Such schemes include the demands for a new international economic order which aimed
to ensure grant developing countries power to regulate trade and foreign investment.
Also, attempts were made to establish international principles concerning foreign direct
investment through an International Trade Organization and Havana Charter.

10

Further discussions will be made on foreign direct investment in subsequent subsections of this chapter.
20

their foreign colonial masters.11 One tactic they adopted to do this was the nationalisation
of property belonging to foreign entities operating within their jurisdictions. A major
motivation for these acts of expropriation was the fear of these independent States that
the dominant foreign presence in their economic sectors would jeopardise their newly
found political independence.12 Because foreign direct investment requires the
commitment of significant capital, technological expertise and managerial skills in each
economic sector where investment is made, the regulation of foreign investment became
a subject of concern for the rapidly industrialising world, particularly in view of the
possibility of expropriation of such investments by the host developing countries.
For developing countries, the objective of expropriation is regaining and retaining
economic sovereignty, while embracing foreign direct investment.13 Consequently, the
growth of foreign direct investment heightened the need for its regulation to ensure
stability, predictability and development. At the same time, as with international trade,
restrictive measures were applied by the host state governments to limit the free flow of
foreign direct investment in order to prevent foreign dominance of their economies. Some
examples of the investment restrictive measures they adopted are: limitation on foreign
participation in certain economic sectors, increased tax burden for foreign investors and
limitation on the value of investment transactions. These measures have stalled the
11

Rafael Leal-Arcas, “The Multilateralization of International Investment Law” (2009)

35 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 1 at 11.
12

Charles P Kindleberger & David B. Audretsch eds., The Multinational Corporation in
the 1980s (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983) 1 at 26.

13

Ibid at 26-27.
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growth of foreign direct investment, and developed countries believe that they need to be
loosened to encourage economic development. It is to ensure such liberalization that
developed states demanded the application of minimum international treatment standards
to foreign direct investment.14
The conclusion of the trade negotiations at the Uruguay round in 1994, led to the
emergence of a new trading era under the WTO, with a particular recognition for the need
to regulate investment. Consequently, the national treatment standard was provided in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)15, General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS)16, the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)17
and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)18 to
regulate both trade and investment.19 However, the limitations20 of these agreements have
14

Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn “Non-discrimination in Trade and Investment
Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?” online: (2008) 102 Am J Int’l
L 48 at 52, online: < http://www.jstor.org/stable/40007768>.

15

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 187.

16

General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 183, 33 ILM
1167.

17

Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, 15 April 1994, 1868 UNTS 186.

[TRIMs Agreement].
18

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1197 [TRIPS].

19

Further discussions on these agreements will be made in subsequent sections of this
chapter with emphasis on the GATS.
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led to the demand by the industrialised nations at the Doha Development Round in 2001
for a multilateral framework for investment to operate under the auspices of the WTO.
A key principle employed by the WTO in its bid to liberalise trade is the nondiscrimination principle, and particularly, the national treatment standard. The national
treatment standard set out in Article XVII of GATS requires member states of the WTO
to treat domestic and foreign products and services alike, and without any form of
discrimination.21 This principle played a great role in the liberalization of international
trade and suggestions have been made by industrialised nations to apply the same rule to
foreign direct investment in 2001.22
The remainder of this chapter provides a conceptual background to the evolution of the
law of foreign direct investment and the national treatment standard. It analyzes the
historical background to the demand for a multilateral framework for investment both
before and in the WTO era. These demands seem to be inspired by the need to protect,
and to ensure stability, transparency and predictability in the regulation of foreign direct
investment. Attempts to provide a regulatory framework for foreign direct investment

20

The agreements are limited in scope as they were established for specific sectors such
as trade, intellectual property and services.

21

Further discussion on the national treatment standard is provided in subsequent

sections of this chapter.
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WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, (14 November 2001) 41

I.L.M. 746

at749, online:

<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm>.
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date back to the 1948 Havana Charter,23 and have continued to resurface in various trade
negotiations over time.24 This chapter traces the several attempts to create a multilateral
framework for foreign direct investment and the factors that contributed to their failures.
An understanding of the unsuccessful past efforts provides the background information
for the analysis of this thesis, and establishes the context for the recommendations it
makes towards finding a workable solution for the regulation of foreign direct investment
under the multilateral framework for investment that negotiators at the Doha hoped to
create.
A. THE LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE
TREATMENT STANDARD: A SURVEY OF ITS EVOLUTION

NATIONAL

The evolution of the national treatment standard dates back to the period when the
different treatment of foreign investors by host states was the subject of controversy.
Scholars like Victoria suggested that aliens and nationals of the host state must be treated
equally, because trading was an expression of a communal feeling natural to man.25
Vattel, on the other hand, thought that national treatment standards in host states may be
low, and so aliens should be treated in accordance with some external standard higher

23

Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, 24 March 1948, UN Doc
E/CONF.2/78.

24

Subsequent sections of this chapter will trace the various forums where attempts to
create a regulatory framework for foreign direct investment have been made.

25

F de Victoria, De Indis et de Jure Belli Reflectiones III, 1917, 5. See also A Anghie,

“Francisco Victoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law” (1996) 5 Social and
Legal Studies at 321 at 326.
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than the national standard.26 The common purpose of the suggested standard was to find a
way to ensure the eradication of barriers to the free flow of trade and later investment
between nations.
During the colonial era, trade activities by foreign colonial masters which would qualify
as foreign direct investment today, were not really regarded as foreign direct investment
because such transactions were regarded as an extension of domestic trade. Foreign direct
investment, though not referred as such, did not require protection, as colonial legal
systems incorporated the concept of imperial power. Foreign direct investment protection
was, thus, guaranteed to investors and the investments they made in the colonies. There
was no need for international rules to be established regarding foreign direct investment.
However, capital-exporting countries that were not involved in the imperial system also
wanted some form of protection for their nationals.
This demand resulted in the development of the international law system of
“extraterritoriality”.27 The United States practiced extraterritoriality and described it as a
system where foreign investors or entities claim protection, diplomatic immunity or

26

E de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of International Law,(1758)
translated by C Fenwick, Classics of International Law II (Washington DC: Carnegie
Institution, 1916) at 1 at 8, 104.

27

For more information on the principle of extraterritoriality, see Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion
[2004] ICJ Rep 136 at paragraphs 107-111.
25

exemption from the legal system and territorial jurisdiction of the host state.28 The
capital-exporting states have sometimes used the extraterritoriality system to justify the
use of force to pursue the investment claims of their nationals in host states, which often
led to intervening in the host states through the use of military force or diplomatic
claims.29 The Drago-Porter Convention of 190730 tried to limit or eradicate this principle.
The Convention was established to prohibit the use of armed force to recover contract
debts from the host state by home states on behalf of its nationals. However, the DragoPorter Convention did not effectively eradicate the use of force as, home states could
legally exercise force to recover debts where the host state refused to submit to arbitration

28

Encyclopaedia of the New American Nation, online:
<http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/EN/Extraterritoriality.html#ixzz1IkjTVTPJ>.

29

See DJ Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 6th ed (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 2004) 267-268; Centre for International Environmental Law, “International
Law of Investment: The Minimum Standards of Treatment”, (2003) The Centre for
International Environmental Law Issue Brief at 1; online:
<http://www.ciel.org/Publications/investment_10Nov03.pdf>.
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Porter Convention on the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of

Contract Debts, Encyclopædia Britannica, Online:
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/471131/Porter-Convention-on-theLimitation-of-the-Employment-of-Force-for-the-Recovery-of-ContractDebts>(Retrieved on 15 April 2011); See George W Scott, “Hague Convention
Restricting the Use of Force to Recover on Contract Claims” (1908) 2 Am J Int'l L 78 at
78 and 89.
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or accept an arbitral award.31 Furthermore, the post-colonial era saw former imperialists
seeking protection for their investment in the ex-colonies. International law regarding
foreign investment was deemed necessary by the international community to protect the
interest of capital-exporting countries where the national laws of host states do not
provide the required levels of protection.32
Apart from the Drago-Porter Convention, general international law principles were
sought by industrialised nations to provide protection to foreign investors. The principle
of state responsibility for injuries to aliens and their property under international law was
linked to the standard of minimum treatment regarding foreign investment.33 State
responsibility permitted the home state to seek remedies from the host state for injuries
done to a foreign investor where such remedies or protection are unavailable in the host
state.34 This is based on the notion that an injury to an alien is an injury to the home
31

Andrew Newcombe & Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties:

Standards of Treatment (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009) 1 at 10.
32

Year Book of the International Law Commission (New York: United Nations

Publication, 1960) Vol. 2 Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1959/Add.l, 1 at 3-9, online:
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1959_v2_e.pdf.
33
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Ibid at 7-17.
The nationality of aliens, which also included corporations, was an important factor
espousing claims under this doctrine. The home state was the only one with legal
standing to pursue the investment claims of its nationals. It has sole discretion to
determine what steps to take to protect the investment interests of its national abroad;
indeed it could decide not to take any steps at all. See Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Co. Case (Belgium v Spain), [1970] ICJ Rep 1 at 3.
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state.35 However, the principle of state responsibility was not satisfactory to home States
and foreign investors, as they could only receive the same treatment accorded to nationals
which, in their opinion, was inadequate because of the unstable system of government in
some host states.36
The standard of treatment to be accorded foreign investors was a matter of urgent
concern, and the clash between the United States and Latin America States on the
treatment of aliens in the 1800s’ (prior World War II) brought this issue to the fore.37
Latin American jurists relied on the “Calvo doctrine”38 to reject the claims of the
developed countries for minimum international standards for the treatment of foreign
traders and investors (foreigners). Increased trade and investment activities of foreigners
made host states, largely developing countries, wary, and restrictions were put in place to
35

M Sornarajah, The Pursuit of Nationalized Property (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1986) 10.

36

A Anghie, "Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in NineteenthCentury International Law" (1999) Harvard International Law Journal1at 22-34.

37

Latin America held the view that the protection accorded to foreign investors should be
limited to remedies available to nationals of the host state, while the United States
sought an external international standard beyond what was available in the host state.

38

The Calvo doctrine was espoused in 1896 by Carlos Calvo, a jurist from Argentina.
The doctrine stipulates that foreigners are not entitled to higher rights than those
accorded to domestic entities and that foreigners are subject to domestic law and the
judicial system of host states, just like citizens of the host state. Hence, foreign
investors should not expect to be treated better or differently from locals. See Centre for
International Environmental Law, supra note 28 at 2.
28

limit foreign direct investment, one of which was through the expropriation of foreign
property without adequate compensation, thereby discouraging foreign direct
investment.39 This attitude was a major cause of concern for developed states as they
sought to exercise their customary international law rights to adequate compensation in
the event of expropriation.40 The argument of Latin American countries was that
foreigners deserved the same treatment granted to nationals of host states in accordance
with the domestic laws of the host state.41 Nicholas DiMascio and Joost Pauwelyn argue
that the Calvo doctrine was an argument for ‘mere’ national treatment under customary
international law.42

39

DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 14 at 52.

40

An example of such expropriation incident is the case of SPP V. Egypt (1983) 22 ILM
752. In this case, South Pacific Properties Ltd (SPP) entered into an agreement with the
Egyptian Government Tourist Corporation to build a tourist complex close to the
Egyptian Pyramids. This agreement was entered into during the regime of President
Sadat. The company began construction which instigated public outcry against the
construction of such a building near the historic pyramids. President Sadat’s regime
ended with his assassination and President Mubarak became the new president of
Egypt. Due to the persistent public outcry against the project, President Mubarak
cancelled the SPP project. This resulted in enormous financial loss to SPP as
construction work had already begun. The matter was referred to arbitration as to the
liability of the government to SPP. See also M Sornarajah, The International Law on
Foreign Investment (New York: Cambridge University Press, Grotius Publications,
1994) at 112.
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DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 14 at 66.
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The absence of comprehensive international rules on the subject of foreign investment led
to discriminatory practices where host states put in place measures to protect, promote
and favour domestic industries at the expense of foreign investment.43 This
discriminatory treatment of foreign investment was not limited to expropriation rights but
also extended to the treatment of foreign investors both at pre-establishment and postestablishment stages.44 Host states, particularly developing countries, sought to retain
their sovereignty by placing measures to prevent excessive foreign dominance of their
economies.
After the World War II, various States sought foreign investment security and, entered
into bilateral treaties on commerce and navigation often referred to as Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation Treaties (FCNs)45. For instance, the United States and Taiwan
FCN of 1946 which granted non-discrimination national treatment rights to United States
43

Wendy E Takacs, “Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis” (2007) 19:4
Economic Inquiry 687 at 687-693, online:
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1981.tb00347.x/pdf>.
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The pre-establishment stage refers to the treatment of foreign investment when it is
being admitted into the host state, while the post-establishment stage refers to its
treatment after admission to the host state. Examples of such restrictions include:
restrictions on the importation of certain equipments necessary for service delivery,
stringent screening procedures and the imposition of heavy tax duties on foreign
investors. See Mary Footer, “The International Regulation of Trade in Services
following Completion of the Uruguay Round” (1995) 29 Int’l L 453.
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The United States entered into twenty-one FCN treaties between 1946 and 1966. See
Rafael Leal-Arcas, supra note 11 at 12.
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corporations conducting business in Taiwan.46 FCN treaties were initially aimed at
facilitating trade liberalization and encouraging economic relationship between nations.
However, with the establishment of the GATT in 1947, which sought to liberalise trade,
FCN treaty goals changed to the protection of foreign direct investment.47
Article III of the 1947 GATT provided for the non-discrimination principle which,
through the national treatment standard, prohibited host states from granting more
favourable treatment to domestic producers, and ensured equal competitive rights
between domestic and foreign producers. The GATT limited the stifling of free trade by
prohibiting the use of internal measures, such as imposition of taxes, to circumvent tariff
reduction commitments made under GATT. This was aimed at eradicating discriminatory
practices by host states between domestic and foreign produce. 48 Attempts to enhance the
national treatment standard and reduce discriminatory practices may have led to the

46

Herman Walker, “Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties”
(1956) 50 Am J Int'l L 373 and 375.

47

Kenneth J Vandevelde, “United States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice”
(1992) 19 Kluwer Law and Taxation 19.
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This provision on non-discrimination is also provided in Article the 1994 GATT and
several other WTO Agreements such as the TRIPS, GATS and TRIMs Agreement.
These Agreements will be discussed in pages 50-54 of this chapter.
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negotiation of the Havana Charter in 1948.49 Standards of treatment similar to those
sought in a multilateral framework of investment at the WTO were provided in the
Havana Charter and, served as precedent in subsequent instruments concerning
international investment including bilateral investment treaties.
The unresolved debates on the scope of treatment standards for foreign investors and, as
outlined above, the limitations of international law principles in this regard, led to the
conclusion of less complicated investment agreements such as bilateral investment
treaties (BIT).50 Under these, countries sought to create favourable conditions for
investments by “imposing international minimum standards respecting, for example,
expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, and non-discrimination”.51 For developed
countries, the rationale behind BITs is the protection of foreign direct investments by
their nationals abroad. Host states, particularly developing countries, participate in BITs

49

The Havana Charter was signed by fifty-four countries on March 24, 1948. It allowed
for international cooperation and rules against anti-competitive business practices. It
also sought to establish an International Trade Organization but failed. Further
discussion on this charter is provided on page 41 of this chapter.

50

The first bilateral investment treaty was signed between Germany and Pakistan in
1959, see Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 25 November 1959,
1963 UNTS 24.
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Thomas L Brewer & Stephen Young, The Multilateral Investment System and
Multinational Enterprises (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 30.
32

to attract foreign investment to accelerate their economic growth.52 Developing countries
were, and are, more willing to embrace foreign investment as they are confident that this
would boost their economic development, albeit, with some form of control over the
inflow of foreign investment.53 This attitude to foreign investment increased the number
of BITs concluded between developed and developing countries.54
The standard of treatment for investments provided in BITs range from national
treatment, most-favoured nation and "fair and equitable treatment".55 It seems that the
dynamic and uncertain nature of investment makes a multilateral framework for
investment unappealing to developing host countries because of the absence of the clear

52

Andrew T Guzman, “Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties” (1998) 38 VA J Int'l L 639 at 669-674.
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United Nations Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD), Trends in
International Investment Agreements: An Overview, UN Doc
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/13(1999), online: United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiitl3_en .pdf> 1 at 6.
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Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, supra note 14 at 67-69. It seems that developing
states are more willing to conclude BITs than a multilateral framework for investment
because of the weight of international obligations. BITs are limited in their scope of
operation and can easily be re-negotiated. A multilateral framework on the other hand,
is an international instrument made up of responsibilities which cannot be avoided
without consequences. Also, a multilateral framework for investment will be an
agreement with all the members of WTO unlike a BIT which can be limited to a certain
group of States.
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buyer-seller linkage, as is the case of goods and services. Also, the outflow of foreign
investment cannot be monitored and controlled. This opinion has been expressed by India
in its submissions to the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and
Investment during negotiations at Doha.56 Also, developing states may be more willing to
conclude BITs than a multilateral framework for investment because of the weight of
international obligations. BITs are limited in their scope of operation, it provides host
countries with bargaining power and can easily be re-negotiated. This gives them desired
control over the regulation of foreign direct investment. A multilateral framework on the
other hand, is an international instrument made up of responsibilities which cannot be
avoided without consequences. Also, a multilateral framework for investment will be an
agreement with all the members of WTO unlike a BIT which can be limited to a
particular State(s).
Despite the fact that the national treatment standard was provided in BITs, the focus was
on expropriation.57 However, with the increase of more favourable standards, such as tax
holidays, provided to domestic investors in host states, and which operated to the
detriment of foreign investment interests, national treatment standard became a subject of
concern for foreign direct investors.58 Foreign direct investors sought to protect their
investment from discriminatory domestic laws that enhanced the investment opportunities
56

Further discussion on negotiations on the need for a multilateral framework for

investment at the WTO Doha Round is provided in Chapter 3
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of domestic investors. This resulted in investment disputes, as this practice was viewed
by the developed countries as indirect expropriation of their investments.
It is quite ironic that the Calvo doctrine earlier referred to, that advocated equal treatment
of domestic and foreign nationals, seems to have assumed fresh relevance. The doctrine
was initially rejected by the developed nations, such as the United States, but it is now
being sought by them as appropriate treatment standard under BITs and a potential
multilateral framework for investment. The desire to have a national treatment standard
thus, shifted from trade to investment disciplines. Developed countries maintained that
this shift in focus was needed to ensure the protection of foreign direct investment. It was
believed that establishing a multilateral framework for investment, with the inclusion of
national treatment standard, would promote, protect and stabilize foreign investment. In
order to achieve these objectives, several attempts have been made to create a multilateral
framework for investment, the latest was at the Doha Round of the WTO. These efforts
will be discussed below, beginning with what foreign direct investment means and its
merits and demerits for the economic development of host states.
B.

THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

1.1

Background: Foreign Direct Investment and Its Place in Host State
Economic Development

Between 1973 and 1996, foreign direct investment witnessed an increase from U.S. $25
billion to U.S. $350 billion per year.59 Furthermore, foreign direct investment has grown
59

OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Frequently Asked Questions and
Answers, online: OECD <http://www.flora.org/flora/archive/mai-info/oecd-faq.htm>
(Retrieved January 10, 2011).
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from about 0.5% of the world’s gross domestic product in 1970 to over 3% in 2008.60
The growth of foreign direct investment may be attributed to its ability to stimulate
economic development through the increase of wealth, modernization, technological
expansion and creation of employment opportunities. According to the World Investment
Report of 2009, the internalization of small and medium sized enterprises play a role in
this growth, though multinational corporations are mostly responsible for the growth of
foreign direct investment.61
The International Monetary Fund defines foreign direct investment as:
investment that is made to acquire a lasting interest in an
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the
investor, the investor's purpose being to have an effective
voice in the management of the enterprise.62
Foreign direct investment refers to the establishment of new businesses and the
procurement of ownership and management of ventures outside the state of the investor.
According to the WTO, foreign direct investment occurs when an investor, resident in
one country, procures an asset in another country with the intention to control and
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manage that asset.63 An important element of foreign direct investment is the desire to
“manage” an enterprise or business, which differentiates it from portfolio investment in
foreign bonds, stocks and other financial instruments.64
Foreign direct investment takes various forms. It may be achieved through direct
investment, the creation of a new enterprise, through mergers and acquisitions or through
joint-ventures.65 The impact of foreign direct investment is experienced in both
developed and developing countries. According to the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), developed countries are responsible for more than
four fifths of the global foreign direct investment outflows and two-thirds of the global
foreign direct investment inflows.66 Furthermore, the outward flow of foreign direct
investment from the developed countries is on the increase,67 and developing countries
receive a large portion of foreign direct investment, as many of them are increasingly
63
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becoming attractive destinations for foreign direct investment. The demand for
international regulation and protection of foreign direct investment by many developed
countries68 is stimulated by the huge amount of capital involved in foreign investment,
the desire to manage foreign investment transactions, and the risks69 associated with
foreign direct investment. This is why there is a yearning to establish minimum treatment
standards for the regulation of foreign direct investment.70
Most host countries are cautious of foreign direct investment because uncontrolled
foreign direct investment may interfere with national policies71 and may also threaten
national security if sensitive economic sectors such as military defence are exposed to
foreign investors. A multilateral framework for investment, as opposed to foreign direct
investment itself, could also restrict their flexibility to control the inflow of foreign direct
investment. Developing host states are particularly apprehensive that excessive foreign
direct investment will interfere with their sovereignty, and this is why they have opposed
efforts to establish a multilateral framework for foreign direct investment. Also, the
68
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possibility that foreign direct investment could be transferred to another location at any
time without warning is a source of concern because it could destabilize the economy of
host countries. The desire to ‘preserve policy space’72 while encouraging foreign direct
investment is an essential motivator in this resistance. Policy space refers to “the scope
for domestic policies, especially in the areas of trade, investment and industrial
development which might be framed by international disciplines, commitments and
global market considerations”.73 Some host countries, irrespective of the stage of
economic development, such as Canada and India, try to enhance the impact of foreign
direct investment by restricting the entry and operation of foreign direct investment in
specified sectors that are of special national interest, such as health care,
telecommunications and banking.
Host governments need flexibility to carry out their international obligations in ways that
also enable them to pursue their developmental objectives. Policy space is necessary to
ensure a balance between the positive and negative effects of foreign direct investment.
Although foreign direct investment increases the flow of capital, technology and
managerial skills which help in the economic development of a host country, the process
should be regulated in order to reduce the risk of the host state’s loss of control over the
72
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inflow of foreign direct investment with its harmful consequences for its economy. An
example of this is when domestic companies have to compete with multinational
corporations in the manufacturing or supply of similar products. Domestic companies of
developing countries lack the wherewithal to adequately compete against such companies
because they do not have the kind of capital, human resources, brand name or
technological advancement possessed by multinationals. An arrangement which permits
the establishment of multinationals in every industry or economic sector of a developing
country without some form of control, though advantageous in some respects will, most
likely, lead to the eradication of domestic companies as they would have to close down if
they are unable to compete. Thus, the unrestricted presence of multinational corporations
in and developed and developing host countries may lead to excessive foreign influence
on the economic activities of the host state.
Customary international law has played a partial role in the regulation of foreign direct
investment. The requirement that a state must compensate a foreign investor in the event
of expropriating an investment asset has been acknowledged74 as a general principle of
international law, and this has helped to shape the regulation of foreign investment.75
Beyond this customary principle, several attempts to regulate foreign direct investment
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through a multilateral framework have been sought. A discussion of the attempts made
prior to the emergence of the WTO and during the WTO era follows.
1.2 Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment prior to the World Trade Organization
Era
Increase in international trade in goods and services, and the need for regulation and
liberalization led to the conclusion of the first multilateral trade agreement, to wit, the
1947 GATT. However, the growth of foreign direct investment did not witness similar
progress due to conflicting opinions as explained earlier76 on the need for a
comprehensive international investment Agreement. As stated previously, several efforts
have been made towards achieving this goal.
The first attempt was the Havana Charter which contemplated the establishment of an
International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1948.77 The Charter contained provisions for
the regulation and protection of foreign investment, including control regarding the preand post-establishment phases of foreign direct investment. This attempt was
unsuccessful because of objections to its provisions from various business interests and
the refusal by the United States to participate in the establishment of the ITO.78
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Another effort was made by a private group in the United Kingdom and Germany via the
Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention in 1959 to provide guidelines for the regulation of
international investments.79 Though unsuccessful, this draft convention led to the
emergence of the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property in 1962
which was published in 1967.80 The latter also suffered a similar fate due to resistance
from less developed south European Member countries.81 In 1976, the OECD adopted the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.82 Although the Guidelines are not
binding, they encourage co-operation and provide for national treatment in the control of
foreign direct investment.83
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The growth of foreign direct investment is closely linked to the increasing activities of
multinational corporations in host states.84 Attempts to control the economic influence of
foreign multinational corporations on developing countries were made by developing
countries through the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations
(UNCTC) established in 1974.85 The main goals of the UNTC were:
to understand the political, economic, social and legal
effects of TNC activity, especially in developing countries;
to secure international arrangements that promote the
positive contributions of TNCs to national development
goals and world economic growth while controlling and
eliminating their negative effects; and to strengthen the
negotiating capacity of host countries, in particular
developing countries, in their dealings with TNCs.86
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The increase of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in the economic activities of the
world led the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1973 to engage a “Group
of Eminent Persons” with the responsibility of advising on the activities of the TNCs
and their impact on development process. The recommendations of this group led to the
establishment of the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporation in 1974
as a subsidiary of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Council. The
UNCTC was established to provide an intergovernmental forum for deliberations on
issues related to TNCs and foreign direct investment.
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The UNCTC aimed to set down fair rights and responsibilities between Transnational
Corporations (TNCs) and the host countries in which they operated. Most developing
countries feared the power of multinational corporations87 and sought to protect their
sovereignty and national development goals against them via what has been dubbed, the
new international economic order88 whose tenets were intended to give them power to
control the inflow of foreign investment. Commentators like Carlos Correa and Nagesh
Kumar have suggested that the attempt by the UNCTC to create a draft code of conduct
for the regulation of multinational corporations failed because of opposition by developed
countries on contentious issues, such as its scope, the application of international law and
the national treatment standard, and the value of compensation for expropriation of
investments by host states.89 Another reason for the failure is the fact that developing
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countries, in a bid to attract foreign direct investment, abandoned their quest for a ‘new
international economic order’ and instead embraced foreign investment by granting,
through treaties and domestic regulations, high standards of protection to the foreign
investments they accepted.90 Consequently, the UNCTC draft code was suspended in
1992.91
Subsequently, developed countries seized the opportunity created by the abandonment of
the quest for a new international economic order to emphasise the need for the creation of
a multilateral framework to protect foreign direct investment for the sake of stability,
transparency and predictability in foreign investment transactions. 92 The fact that no
multilateral framework for investment existed, sparked the negotiation of bilateral and
regional agreements to regulate foreign direct investment.
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Charter Treaty95 (ECT), and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).96
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA seems to be the most comprehensive Agreement on the
regulation and liberalization of foreign investment. It provides high standards for the
treatment of foreign investment, such as pre-entry and post-entry national treatment,
including protection from direct and indirect expropriation by the host states. The
NAFTA provides a model international minimum standard for the protection and security
for foreign investment. Furthermore, the investor-State dispute resolution mechanism
provided in the Agreement makes it unique - it grants investors direct access to defend
their investment rights in a State that may have violated those rights.97
Another treaty worthy of note is the Energy Charter Treaty, which provides a multilateral
framework for energy cooperation among members of the European Community. The
ECT was designed “to promote energy security through the operation of more open and
competitive energy markets, while respecting the principles of sustainable development
and sovereignty over energy resources”.98 These agreements help to regulate foreign
direct investment on a country by country basis. Parties to the agreement are thus able to
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negotiate the terms of each agreement based on their respective domestic need for an
inflow of foreign direct investment.
Non-state actors, such as the World Bank, also recognised the need to regulate foreign
direct investment. The World Bank formulated its Guidelines on the Treatment of
Foreign Direct Investment in 1992 (World Bank Guidelines).99 The World Bank
Guidelines are based on the general premise that “equal treatment of investors in similar
circumstances and free competition among them is a prerequisite to positive investment
environment”.100 It sets out the legal framework for regulating foreign direct investment
through provisions on the admission, treatment, expropriation and settlement of disputes
in relation to foreign investment.101 The World Bank Guidelines recommend the
liberalization of foreign direct investment subject to a “restricted list” of investments.
This allows host states to restrict, prohibit, or screen foreign direct investment in certain
sectors of their economies on the ground that an investment may conflict with domestic
development objectives.
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The first attempt to formulate multilateral rules to regulate foreign investment was made
by the United States during the Uruguay Round of the GATT102 in 1986. The attempt was
opposed by developing countries because they were concerned about the validity of
negotiating investment rules under GATT. Thus, negotiations regarding investment
during the Uruguay Round were restricted to trade related investment measures.103
The OECD also sought to regulate foreign direct investment through a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1994.104 The MAI105 was formally proposed by the
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United States under the auspices of the OECD106 in 1995. This was never adopted
because the developed countries opposed some of its text. Some OECD countries, mainly
from the European Community, did not want to accord national treatment to the
privatization of government enterprises.107 Human and environmental rights groups also
protested against the MAI on the ground that it did not address labour issues and
environmental degradation problems caused by the activities of multinational
corporations, but that it only sought to protect the investments of multinational
corporations in host states. Stefan Amarasinha and Juliane Kokott are of the opinion that
the MAI did not succeed because: it sought to simultaneously require national treatment
standard at pre-establishment and post-establishment stages, and that there was an
absence of precision in the relationship between the MAI and existing investment
agreements.108
Some of the foregoing instruments109 are guidelines and so are not binding. A more
recent attempt to regulate foreign direct investment has been undertaken through the
WTO, and to this, the discussion now turns.
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1.3

Investment Regime under the World Trade Organization

The WTO Agreement110, an offshoot of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations
established the WTO in 1995. Prior to the establishment of the WTO, the GATT111
regulated international trade. The WTO established an institutional framework that took
over this mandate and replaced the GATT. The WTO aims to promote and liberalize
world trade by advancing market access and encouraging economic development among
its members.112 Several other agreements were concluded during the Uruguay Round.
This thesis lays emphasis on investment related Agreements: GATS, TRIMS and TRIPS.
These Agreements regulate investment peripherally and provides some elementary
frameworks for the regulation of investment related subjects. Among the lot, this thesis
focuses on the GATS because it is the most comprehensive agreement on investment to
date under the auspices of the WTO.
The GATS promotes service liberalization and provides a multilateral framework for the
regulation of trade in services.113 It aims to promote economic development by increasing
market access to trade in services and employment opportunities, and regulates trade in
services through its four modes of service delivery, namely, cross-border supply,
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consumption abroad, commercial presence and presence of natural persons.114 Under
GATS, foreign direct investment is regulated through the “commercial presence” mode
of service delivery. This arises where a service supplier sets up a corporation or business,
or acquires foreign ownership of an extant corporation in a foreign country which
provides the avenue to offer services related to its investment portfolio. In order to
promote the liberalization of services and limit or eradicate barriers to foreign direct
investment regarding trade in services, the GATS stipulates a minimum standard of
treatment of foreign investors by the host state in order to protect their economic
interests. In this context, foreign direct investment refers only to the supply of services.
The TRIMs Agreement is closely connected to the GATT. The GATT regulates trade in
goods, and Article III provides for the national treatment standard to prohibit
discrimination between foreign and domestic goods, while Article XI proscribes the use
of quantitative restrictions.115 The TRIMs Agreement is limited to the regulation of
investments related to trade in goods.116 It prohibits the use of trade related investment
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measures to distort trade.117 It mandates members of the WTO to notify it of any existing
TRIMs118 and stipulates the period within which to eradicate such measures. The
Committee on TRIMs monitors and ensures the implementation of these obligations.119
The TRIPS Agreement aims to safeguard intellectual property rights and technological
transfer.120 In this context, foreign direct investment involves the relocation of technology
by the foreign investor from its home state to the host state. The investor is thus able to
perform adequately in the same manner as it would in the home country, hence the need
for investment protection.
The TRIMs, TRIPS and GATS agreements do not regulate investment per se, but
disciplines related to investment. At best, they are investment related agreements.
However, the GATS seems to be the most comprehensive agreement regulating foreign
direct investment due to its provision on the supply of services through “commercial
presence”. The GATS has, to an extent, contributed to the protection and liberalization of
investment related subjects via its provisions on transparency, most favoured nation
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treatment, market access, balance of payments and the national treatment standard which
employs the positive-list approach to allow for the flexibility of its rules.121
Although the topic of investment has been at the hub of multilateral negotiations at the
WTO since the 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore,122 no investment
agreement has been concluded. Two opposing positions on the subject may have
contributed to this stagnant situation. Opinions on the need for a multilateral framework
for investment are divided mainly between developed and developing countries.
As noted above, the provisions of GATS, TRIMs and TRIPS in relation to the regulation
of foreign direct investment, do not form a comprehensive framework for foreign direct
investment. The developed countries have, therefore, tried to expand the scope of the
regulation of foreign direct investment under the WTO by stressing the need for a
multilateral framework achieved through multilateral negotiations. As observed by
Nagesh Kumar, for the developed states, this is “part of their strategy to secure more
121
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favourable conditions for overseas operations of their enterprises that use foreign direct
investment as a mode of servicing foreign markets more than trade”.123 The reason for
this may be that foreign direct investment in some host states is less expensive than other
modes of service delivery outline above. But the developing countries have resisted these
attempts for fear of losing sovereignty and control to regulate the inflow of foreign direct
investment to them.
The WTO set up a Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment at
the Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 1996 (Singapore Meeting)124 to examine the
relationship between trade and investment. Also at the Ministerial Conference held in
2001, the need for “a multilateral framework to secure transparent, stable and predictable
conditions for long-term cross-border investment”125 was discussed by WTO members.
Various investment issues were discussed subsequently, such as the definition of
investment; non-discrimination principles; expropriation and performance requirements;
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balance-of-payment safeguards; and dispute resolution.126 However, due to the
controversy between developed and developed countries on the scope of the above
outlined issues, including the national treatment standard, the negotiation process for a
multilateral framework for investment were stalled, and investment issues were
eventually dropped from the WTO agenda in August 2004.127
CONCLUSION
The historical analysis provided above reveals that the quest for a multilateral framework
for foreign investment has been a subject of interest to both developed and developing
countries for a long time. The various attempts made through different international law
principles and institutions ranging from the Havana Charter, attempts to create an ITO,
the Shawcross Draft Convention, the OECD, the UNCTC, the World Bank and the WTO
all point to the fact that the regulation of foreign direct investment is crucial to economic
development and an increase in the flow of foreign direct investment. The treatment of
foreign investors by host states has been the core of major disagreements between host
states and investor states. As explained in this chapter, the divergence in opinions dates
back to the disputes between Latin American States and the United States on the
appropriate treatment of foreign investors. The demands for national treatment standard
by the developed countries were rejected by the Latin American states who favoured the
application of the Calvo doctrine which, today, represents the “national treatment
126
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standard” requiring equal treatment of domestic and foreign investors. But as shown
above, the national treatment standard, which the developed countries now want to
implement under a multilateral framework for investment, is no longer satisfactory to
developing countries. Developing countries fear that when foreign direct investment is
controlled by international standards, it would limit their sovereign right to pursue
domestic policies. This disagreement has stalled progress in attempts to create a
multilateral framework for investment.
The push to create a multilateral framework for investment under the WTO may be due to
the fact that the WTO was probably viewed as the best institution to facilitate this process
because it has overseen the development of several multilateral agreements in the past.
The success of this approach remains elusive, due to longstanding disagreements on
many issues of controversy. The need to protect and regulate foreign direct investment is
not controversial, though the scope of such regulation is the subject of disagreement.
One such element of contention is the divergent opinions on the inclusion of the national
treatment standard in a multilateral framework for investment. The developed and
developing countries view its implications differently. The developed countries argue that
including the national treatment standard in the multilateral framework for investment
will increase foreign direct investment flows, ensure equal rights to competition, ensure
transparency and provide the necessary stability and protection for foreign investment.
Developing countries, on the other hand, argue that uncontrolled foreign direct
investment facilitated through national treatment standard will harm their economic
development and deprive them of the right to determine the level of foreign direct
56

investment they would welcome. These conflicting views remain present in current
negotiations for a multilateral framework for investment, and thus, require thorough
analysis, as to its acceptability within a multilateral framework for investment framework
for the regulation of foreign direct investment, and as a catalyst to facilitate the
emergence of a multilateral framework for investment.
The foregoing historical background provides the necessary understanding of the pros
and cons of a multilateral framework for investment. It also provides information on the
reasons previous attempts have been unsuccessful as recurring oppositions mainly from
developing countries have not really changed. Furthermore, it provides the platform from
which to launch the analysis and make recommendations on the way forward towards
achieving the multilateral framework for investment, while noting the problems of the
past.
The next chapter of this thesis discusses in details the positions of developed and
developing countries at the Doha negotiation rounds. It also analyzes how the perspective
of both sides on the creation of a multilateral framework for investment, impacts on the
economic development of the host states, and how it protects the interests of foreign
investors. This analysis will facilitate appreciation of the standpoint of developing
countries in their resistance to the establishment of a multilateral framework for
investment. It will also provide the basis for the proposition of the thesis that the national
treatment standard should be included in the multilateral framework for investment but its
scope should be limited to specific economic sectors, to which members permit its
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application as inherent in GATS, in order to balance its positive and negative effects on
the economies of developing countries.
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CHAPTER 3: NATIONAL TREATMENT STANDARD IN A MULTILATERAL
FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT: IMPACT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
INTRODUCTION
As discussed in previous chapters of this thesis, several efforts to establish a multilateral
framework for investment through various institutions were unsuccessful. Thus, foreign
direct investment has been regulated largely by bilateral and regional investment
agreements. Demands for a multilateral framework for investment by developed countries
persisted and attempts were made through the WTO. By 2001, the stage was set for the
negotiation of a multilateral framework for investment at the Doha1 held in Qatar in 2001
under the auspices of the WTO. However, the divergent opinions of developed and
developing countries have stalled progress in the Doha trade negotiations, and investment
issues as explained in chapter 2 were dropped from the Doha agenda in 2004.2 A major
source of disagreement was whether the non-discrimination principle, particularly the
national treatment standard, should be included in the multilateral framework for
investment, and if so, what should be its scope.
Developed countries advocated for the inclusion of the national treatment standard
because in their view, it would provide the much needed stability, security and
transparency to the investment regime. Developing countries, on the other hand, strongly
opposed this view because they feared that the national treatment standard would hamper
1

Further discussion on the Doha Development Round is provided in pages 60-63 of this
chapter.

2

World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Doha Agenda, online: WTO
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/doha1_e.htm.
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economic development and encroach on their right to pursue national development
policies.
This chapter will discuss the role of the non-discrimination principle, particularly the
national treatment standard, in the regulation of foreign direct investment. It will analyse
the positions of developed and developing countries at the Doha negotiations, and the
perspectives of both sides on how the creation of a multilateral framework for investment
will impact the economic development of host states, and how it will protect the interests
of foreign investors.
A.

THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND THE CREATION OF A
MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT

1.1

Background

As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, a working group was set up by the WTO to examine the
relationship between trade and investment at the Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 1996.3
The purpose of this meeting was to formulate a basis for the negotiation of a multilateral
framework for investment. The Doha Round was a follow up to the Singapore meeting in
1996 and commenced during the fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar in 2001.4
3

The World Trade Organization, Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and
Investment, online: The World Trade Organization
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_e.htm>.

4

The WTO ministerial meetings rounds aim to establish liberalized trade regimes which
would foster economic development and relations among members as was achieved
with trade and services through series of negotiations. Subsequent ministerial meetings
on international trade matters were held in Cancun in 2003; and Hong Kong in 2005.
Similar negotiations also took place in Switzerland in 2004, 2006, 2008; Paris, France
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The Doha Round is the current trade negotiation in the WTO which highlights
development as its core objective. It seeks to pursue the needs and interest of developing
countries by making efforts to ensure that they, and the least-developed countries,
secure a share in the growth of world trade commensurate with
the needs of their economic development. In this context,
enhanced market access, balanced rules, and well targeted,
sustainably financed technical assistance and capacity-building
programmes have important roles to play.5
The objective of the Doha round was to further reduce trade barriers and liberalize
international trade which would enhance economic development as commenced by the
GATT. Among other issues,6 the creation of a multilateral framework for investment was
one of the most controversial issues dealt with at the meeting.7 Members of the WTO
decided to commence negotiations on a multilateral framework on investment upon an
agreement on the scope and content of the negotiations at the next ministerial meeting at
Cancun in 2003.

2005; and Germany in 2007. Online:
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doha_Development_Round>.
5

WTO, Doha Development Agenda: Negotiations, Implementation and Development,

online: WTO <www.wto.org>.
6

Such as the definition of investment, transparency, non-discrimination, provisions on
development, balance of payments, pre-establishment rules on investment and dispute
settlement etc.

7

WTO, supra note 2.
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The investment mandate of the WTO is set out in paragraphs 20-22 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration (Declaration).8 It provides in paragraph 20, member states of the
WTO recognize “the case for a multilateral framework to secure transparent, stable and
predictable conditions for long-term cross-border investment, particularly foreign direct
investment”.9
Also, paragraph 22 of the Declaration highlighted certain investment issues which were
to be the focus of the working group on the relationship between trade and investment
(WGTI) set up in 1996. These issues include,
scope

and

definition;

transparency;

non-discrimination;

modalities for commitments based on a GATS-type, positive list
approach; development provisions; exceptions and balance-ofpayments safeguards; and consultation and the settlement.10
These issues generated huge controversies between developed and developing countries
which thwarted the progress of negotiating a multilateral framework for investment
during the Doha. Eventually, investment issues had to be dropped from the Doha agenda
in 2004 during the Cancun meeting due to the conflicting views of developed and
developing countries on the subject.11 As explained in chapter 1, this thesis limits its
8

WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, (14 November 2001) 41
ILM 746 at 749, online: WTO
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm>.

9

Ibid at para 20.

10

Ibid at para 22.

11

WTO, supra note 2.
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discussion to the non-discrimination principle investment issue, particularly the national
treatment standard, because it is the most controversial issue regarding the formulation of
a multilateral framework for investment.
Developed countries have advocated for a multilateral framework for investment in order
to regulate, protect and ensure stability in foreign investment transactions. They believe
that including the non-discrimination principle, which comprises both the most-favoured
nation principle and the national treatment standard in the multilateral framework for
investment, will help to achieve these objectives and increase the flow of foreign direct
investment. Developing countries, on the other hand, fear that a multilateral framework
for investment will encroach on their rights to regulate and determine the inflow of
foreign direct investment. It would also interfere with their control over growth and
development of their economies. Furthermore, they believe that including the national
treatment standard in the multilateral framework for investment may harm the economic
growth of developing host states.
1.2

Investment Discussions at the Doha Development Round

Developed countries like those of the European Community, Japan and Korea, took the
position during the Doha Round that it is necessary to provide a comprehensive
investment framework for the regulation of foreign investment. According to the
European Community, this is because, “the patchwork of rules [relating to investment] is
unsatisfactory and being increasingly seen as an inefficient and non-transparent
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framework for making investments and protecting investments abroad”12. Switzerland
expressed the view that,
a transparent and predictable foreign direct investment
regime is one of the key conditions to attract international
investment. A multilateral agreement on such investment
will provide a common basic framework in this important
policy area.13
The aim of a multilateral agreement would be to create a foreign investment regime
comparable to that which already exists for trade in goods and services.14 Singh and

12

WTO, Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment,

Communications from European Community and its Member States – Concept Paper on
Non- discrimination, Doc No. WT/WGTI/W/1, 30 May 1997, page 2, online:
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/W122-e.pdf.
13

WTO, Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment,

Communications from Switzerland-Multilateral Framework for Investment: An
Approach to Development Provisions, Doc. No. WT/WGTI/W/133, 18 July 2002,
paragraph 24, online: WTO http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/W133-e.pdf.
14

A Singh, “Foreign Direct Investment and International Agreements: South

Perspective”, South Centre Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity Series,
Occasional Paper No. 6, October 2001, online:
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=25289.
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Zammit15 are of the opinion that such a regime may demand high investor protection
standards and introduce obligations prohibiting the use of restrictions on the free flow of
foreign direct investment. These obligations may include granting foreign investors the
right of establishment, the right to exit the host country and repatriate capital, elimination
of performance requirements put in place by host governments to restrict foreign direct
investment and impose most-favoured nation and national treatment obligations on host
states. Developed countries argued that:
The creation of a multilateral framework for investment is
a way to increase efficiency with which the world's scarce
resources are used, and that failure to reach a multilateral
agreement will result in a slowdown of foreign direct
investment flows. These arguments are based on the
perception that trade and foreign direct investments are
simply two alternative but increasingly complementary and
interlinked ways of servicing foreign markets.16

15

A Singh and A Zammit, “Foreign Direct Investment: Towards Co- operative

Institutional arrangements between the North and the South?” in Jonathan Michie &
John Grieve Smith, eds, Global Instability and World Economic Governance, (New
York: Routledge Press, 1999) 30.
16

Rafael Leal-Arcas, “The Multilateralization of International Investment Law” (2009)

35 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 33; On this
issue, see also World Trade Organization, Press Release, 57, “Trade and Foreign Direct
Investment”, (9 October 1996) online:
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm>.
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During the Doha Round, the European Community called for an expansion of foreign
direct investment obligations by the extension of the traditional trade regulations to
investment, including the national treatment standard, thereby expanding the scope of the
latter. This, it was proposed, would regulate and further liberalize foreign investment by
creating easy market access at both the pre-entry and post-entry phases of an investment.
The pre-establishment stage refers to the treatment of foreign investment when it is being
admitted into the host state, while the post-establishment stage refers to its treatment after
admission to the host state.17 Furthermore, it was argued that a multilateral framework for
investment would guarantee the protection of investment through a minimum
international treatment standard which would overcome the shortcomings of bilateral,
multilateral and regional agreements. It was also argued that a multilateral framework for
investment would ensure stability and predictability in foreign investment.18
Indeed, foreign direct investment plays a role in the development of developing countries,
as it increases their economic growth through the flow of capital, managerial skills and
increase in production. However, developing countries in Asia, particularly India, are
concerned that such an agreement will deprive them of the right to negotiate and weigh
the benefits of future investments vis-a-vis the risk associated with them. Arvind
Panagariya argued that foreign direct investment is unlike trade, because developing
17

An explanation of the pre-establishment and post-establishment stages of investment is
provided in pages 30 and 108 of this thesis.

18

Benno Ferarini, “A Multilateral Framework for Investment?” in Simon J Evenette, et
al, The Singapore Issues and World Trading System: The Road to Cancum and
Beyond, (Bern: Staatssekretariat fur Wirtschaft, 2003) 1.
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countries are predominantly importers of investment and have few export activities in this
area.19 Although a multilateral framework for investment would increase capital and
foster development in developing countries, it would bring with it additional obligations
which restrict the freedom of these host countries to pursue their domestic development
policies. Thus, the benefits of a multilateral framework for investment may not be
commensurate with its disadvantages if the quality of foreign direct investment is not
controlled. Furthermore, developed countries, being the major exporters of investment,
benefit largely from this without having to bear additional obligations.20
Developing countries believe that such an outcome would disable them from being able
to control the inflow of foreign direct investment, and could lead to excessive foreign
control over their vital socio-economic areas.21 In practice, developing countries could
cease to be able to determine the kind of foreign investment to embrace. They could also
be precluded from imposing restrictions to ensure that such investments are in
19

The continual development growth of some developing countries such as India, Brazil
and China, and their impressive export activities shows that Panagariya’s opinion on
this issue may not be entirely true.

20

Arvind Panagariya, “Developing Countries at Doha: A Political Economy Analysis”,

(2005) 25:9 The World Economy 1205-1233, online:
<http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwpit/0308015.html>.
21

Robert Wade, “What Strategies are Viable for Developing Countries Today? The

World Trade Organization and the Shrinking of ‘Development Space’”, Crises States
Programme Working Paper Series no. 31 (London: Crises States Programme, 2003),
online: London School of Economics and Political Science Research
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/28239>.
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consonance with their national policies and objectives aimed at benefiting their
economies as a whole.22 Opponents of the multilateral framework for investment believe
that the combined limit this imposes on developing state government intervention in
foreign direct investment encroaches on their national sovereignties.23
These divergent opinions on creating a multilateral framework for investment were
debated during deliberations at the Doha Round between 2001 and 2004. The principal
focus of this debate was on the issue of the non-discrimination principle, which is the
topic of the next section of this thesis.
B.

NATIONAL TREATMENT STANDARD AND A MULTILATERAL
FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT

1.1

Principle of Non-discrimination under the World Trade Organization

Non-discrimination is a core principle of international trade; it is central to almost all
international trade and investment agreements. According to the WTO Secretariat:
it is the principle that underwrites most directly the process
of international economic integration, since it binds a
treaty's participants together by guaranteeing that none of

22

Kumar, Nagesh. Protecting Foreign Investment: Implications of a WTO Regime and

Policy Options (London: Zed Books, 2003) 128.
23

Stephen S Golub, Measures of Restrictions on Inward Foreign Direct Investment for

OECD Countries, OECD Economic Studies No. 36 (2003) 86, online: OECD
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/20/33638671.pdf>.
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them will be picked out and treated unfavourably on the
grounds of their nationality.24
It prohibits the use of discriminatory measures on the basis of origin or destination of a
service or service supplier by member countries against foreigners. As explained in
chapter 2, the operation of this principle is achieved through the most-favoured-nation
and national treatment standards which are provided in some WTO Agreements such as
the GATT25, the TRIMs26 and the TRIPs27. The non-discrimination principle has many
advantages, such as fostering healthy competition that can lead to increased allocation of
resources. It also encourages stability, liberalization and easy market access, and
promotes transparency and predictability of government policies, thereby limiting
commercial risks. The principle was originally applied in trade agreements, but is now
incorporated in bilateral and multilateral investment agreements.
The inclusion of the non-discrimination principle in the multilateral framework for
investment was a sensitive issue at the Doha Round, particularly the national treatment
24

WTO Secretariat, Note on Non-Discrimination: Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment and
National Treatment, Doc. No. WT/WGTI/W/118, online: WTO
<http://www.International.Gc.Ca/Trade-AgreementsAccordsCommerciaux/Assets/Pdfs/W118-E.Pdf>.
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 187 [GATT].
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Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, 15 April 1994, 1868 UNTS 186.
[TRIMs].

27

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1197 [TRIPS].
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standard. The national treatment standard requires the equal treatment of foreign and
domestic investors in like circumstances. It obligates a host state to treat foreign investors
the same way it treats its local investors, and to refrain from granting preferential
treatment or conditions to local investors that would operate to the detriment of foreign
investors. This ensures that foreign investors are given an equal opportunity to compete
in the domestic market. Discrimination may take various forms, such as imposing
stringent screening procedures and heavy tax duties on foreign investors, and restrictions
on the importation of certain equipment necessary for service delivery.
The national treatment standard may be applied at pre-establishment or postestablishment stages.28 WTO Agreements like the GATS,29 apply the national treatment
standard only at the post-investment stage. This enables host states to retain the power to
control and regulate the entry of foreign direct investment. It is important to note that
only American-Canadian treaties provide for pre-entry establishment. An example of
such an agreement is the NAFTA30 which provides for both pre-entry and post-entry
national treatment obligations.

28

Further explanation of the pre-establishment and post-establishment stages of
investment is provided on pages 30 and 108.

29

General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 183, 33 ILM
1167.

30

North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, The

Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States of America, 17
December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2, 32 ILM 289.
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The scope of the national treatment standard, if included in the multilateral framework for
investment, is a source of disagreement among developed countries, and between
developed and developing countries. The question is whether it is at the pre-establishment
or post-establishment stage that the national treatment standard should be applied. A
further issue is, whether the standard should adopt the “top-down” or “bottom up”
approach.31 As discussed in chapter 1, the “top-down” approach would make the national
treatment standard a general obligation that would apply to all measures affecting
investments, unless where exceptions are made.32 The “bottom up” approach refers to a
specific obligation which applies only to those sectors that a member has committed to in
its schedule.33
The essence of defining the scope of operation of the national treatment standard in the
multilateral framework for investment is to strike a balance between enhancing the
protection of foreign investment, and securing flexibility for host countries to pursue
domestic policy. The non-discrimination principle plays a great role in the regulation and
liberalization of foreign direct investment, however, the effects of such liberalization on
31

The “top-down” and “bottom up” approach is often used interchangeably with the

negative and positive list approach respectively.
32

David P Fidler & GATS Legal Review Team for the World Health Organization,

Legal Review of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) from a Health
Policy Perspective, Globalization, Trade and Health Working Papers Series, online:
<http://whqlibdoc.who.int/gats/GATS_Legal_Review_eng.pdf>.
33

M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (New York: Cambridge

University Press, Grotius Publications, 1994) 269 at 300.
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host states must be considered. An analysis of the divergent perspectives on this subject
matter at the Doha Round between 2001 and 2004 will provide insight on this debate.
1.2

Developed and Developing Countries’ Views on the Need for a Multilateral
Framework for Investment

(a)

Developed Countries’ Perspectives

The major players that demand a multilateral framework for investment are the European
Community, Canada, the US and Japan.34 Although some of the content of their demands
differed, their desire for a multilateral framework for investment was clear. The key
elements of the developed countries’ proposal for a multilateral framework for
investment range between, the definition of investment, transparency, non-discrimination,
provisions on development, balance of payments, pre-establishment rules on investment
and dispute settlement.35 The non-discrimination principle is the focus here, and I now
turn to the submissions of some developed countries on this subject.
(i)

Communications from the European Community

The European Community was of the view that host countries treat foreign investors in
discriminatory ways for various reasons which may be justified.36 Some of the reasons
34

Ferrarini, supra note 18 at 6.

35

WTO, supra note 2.

36

WTO, Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment,

Communications from European Community and its Member States – Concept Paper on
Non- discrimination, Doc No. WT/WGTI/W/1, 30 May 1997, page 2, online: WTO
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/W122-e.pdf.
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are to ensure national security and promote environmental protection. The European
Community stated that the absence of a customary international law principle on the
subject emphasised the need to include it in the multilateral framework for investment.37
The European Community argued that this would level the playing field for foreign direct
investment between host and home states, increase the distribution of capital, promote
transparency and minimize distortions in the growth of foreign investment.38
The European Community also argued that all countries acknowledge that foreign
investors can only be attracted to host states by the provision of certain pre-conditions,
such as “a predictable, transparent and non-discrimination regulatory framework, beyond
macroeconomic and political stability, infrastructure and labour skills”.39 This seems to
be why most bilateral investment treaties, as well as regional and multilateral investment
agreements have provisions on the non-discrimination principle. The European
Community argued that it was time for a consolidation of non-discrimination provisions
in a multilateral framework for investment.
Consequently, the European Community proposed that the multilateral framework for
investment should include a general national treatment obligation binding on all member
states of the WTO at the post-establishment stage, giving room for possible exceptions.40
37

Ibid at 2.

38

Ibid.
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Ibid.

40

Ibid.
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Also, they suggested that specific obligations on national treatment should be applied at
the pre-establishment stage when foreign investment is being admitted. However, the
European Community argued that the application of national treatment should be
restricted to the sectors listed in each country’s schedule of commitments, including each
member’s limitations on the applicability of the national treatment standard.41 They also
took the position that other exceptions, such as subject-42 and country-specific43
exceptions to national treatment, should also be considered.
The European Community concluded that the above regulatory measures for foreign
investment would contribute greatly towards enhancing the legal security and coherence
of international investment rules and, at the same time, would not hinder host countries,
particularly developing countries, from achieving their domestic policies.44
ii.

Communications from Canada

Canada had views similar to those of the European Community on the need for a
multilateral framework for investment. Canada argued that the multilateral framework for
investment reflects the Doha mandate, which is to balance the interests of home and host

41

Ibid at 4.

42

Subject-specific exceptions may exclude the application of national treatment standards

on certain subjects such as taxation, intellectual property and public procurement.
43

Country –specific exceptions permits certain countries to derogate from applying the

national treatment standard in certain sectors of their economy.
44

Ibid at 4.
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countries, taking into consideration the desire of host governments to pursue development
policies and objectives.45
Canada took the position that “policies conducive to attracting foreign investment, such
as transparent and non-discrimination administrative norms and legal standards, are an
essential condition for economic growth”.46 Canada also argued that the nondiscrimination principle must be the cornerstone of the multilateral framework for
investment, and it is necessary to safeguard the financial interests of foreign investors in
host countries. Canada suggested, like the European Community, that a national
treatment provision in the multilateral framework for investment be made a general
obligation with defined exceptions or reservations to certain provisions which it considers
to be a more transparent approach than a positive list approach. Canada took the position
that the negative list approach undermines the power of the non-discrimination principle
47

by limiting its scope and providing avenues for host countries to derogate from it.
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WTO Ministerial Declaration, supra note 8.
WTO, Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade And Investment,

Communications From Canada – Non-discrimination and Modalities for PreEstablishment Commitments based on a GATS-Type, Positive List Approach, Doc. No.
WT/WGTI/W/131, 3 July 2002, paragraph 1, online: WTO
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The positive list approach permits members of the WTO to choose the specific sectors
of their economies in which national treatment would apply or stipulate conditions
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However, Canada also argued that a distinction between pre- and post-establishment
national treatment may undermine the meaning of the national treatment standard, and
suggested that the principle be applied like the most-favoured nation principle48 which
does not make such distinctions. This will enable foreign investors to determine the
existence of the non-discrimination principle by its application from the onset, that is, at
the pre-establishment stage. This principle encourages the increase of foreign direct
investment flows as foreign investors are more willing to commit capital, manpower and
technology for the long term, as they believe that the national treatment standard provides
the necessary security for their investments.
Canada argued that the economic development interests of host states, particularly
developing and least developed countries, are protected by the exceptions permitted
under the negative list approach. This is because parties are permitted to exempt broad
sectors of their economy from the national treatment standard which allows for flexibility
to pursue national policies. The NAFTA provided an example of how this can work.

under which it would apply. The negative list approach mandates all members to
comply with an obligation but permits certain exceptions.
48

The most favoured nation rule as explained in chapter 1 restrains members from
granting preferences to certain members while excluding others. Members of the WTO
are entitled to any condition of trade or service granted to another member, whether
favourable or restrictive in nature.
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Annex 3 of the NAFTA permits Mexico, a developing country, to exempt certain sectors
like petroleum, electricity and railroads from the non-discrimination principle.49
Canada pointed out that transparency is crucial and underlines the non-discrimination
principle.50 An important factor in making reservations and exemptions to the national
treatment standard is the need for exempted sectors to be properly stated, along with a
description of how the permitted discrimination would apply in those sectors. Canada
suggested comprehensive transparency obligations similar to those in the GATS to ensure
transparency in the multilateral framework for investment.51 The GATS’ provision on
transparency in Article III of the Agreement requires member states of the WTO to bring
existing national laws, regulations, administrative guidelines and policies, new laws or
change in existing laws which affect trade in services to the knowledge of all other
member states upon its entry into force, or upon demand by member states. A publication
of commitments to international agreements relating to trade in services is also required.52
Canada argued that a similar provision in the multilateral framework for investment

49
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NAFTA, supra note 30 at Annex 3.
WTO, Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, supra note

46 at 5.
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regarding exemptions and reservations will promote predictability and stability in the
regulation of foreign investment.53
Canada concluded that these measures would assist in the development of a multilateral
framework for investment under the auspices of the WTO, and would appropriately take
into account the concerns of developing countries regarding economic development.
iii.

Communications from Japan

Japan, like the other developed countries discussed above, supported the inclusion of the
national treatment standard in the multilateral framework for investment, because it
would improve predictability and promote the growth of foreign investment in host
countries. Japan noted that existing investment agreements already provide for the
national treatment standard, though the agreements include certain exceptions which take
into account the development stage of each country and the need to retain the right to
regulate national policies. Japan has expressed the opinion that too many exceptions
would hamper the principle of national treatment, and advocates for a progressive
liberalization technique that would ensure the gradual removal of exceptions depending
on changes in the social and economic development of host states. This is because Japan
took the position that national treatment is an essential factor for maintaining a balance
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WTO, Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, supra note
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between countries’ rights and obligations, and the multilateral trade and investment
system.54
Japan argued that national treatment should cover both pre- and post-establishment stages
of investment in order to ensure predictability in the multilateral investment system. It
concluded that member states need to discuss whether the treatment standard should be a
general or specific obligation, and to agree on the type and scope of exceptions to be
accepted within the multilateral framework.55
iv.

Communications from the United States

The United States did not argue much on the need to include a national treatment
standard in a multilateral framework for investment. More emphasis was laid on the
definition and scope of foreign direct investment. The United States argued that the
multilateral framework for investment is crucial to the development of an investment
regime for investment. The United States’ position on the scope of the non-discrimination
principle to be applied differs from those of the developed countries discussed above,
however. The United States advocated for the inclusion of the national treatment standard
as a general obligation at both the pre-establishment and post-establishment stages of
54
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investment. Also, the United States sought to employ the negative list approach in the
application of the treatment standard. The United States argued that this will increase the
growth of foreign direct investment and enhance economic development.
v.

Overview

The foregoing summarizes the views of many developed countries on the need for the
multilateral framework for investment and the inclusion of the national treatment
standard in the agreement. They shared similar beliefs: that a multilateral framework for
investment would increase the flow of foreign direct investment, promote economic
development; and improve the transparency, stability and predictability of international
investment. They also took the position that the multilateral framework for investment
would reduce investment risks, such as the fear of corrupt practices, political and legal
instability in host states, thereby reducing investment risks. Also, they agreed that the
multilateral framework for investment would enhance the credibility of host government
investment policies thus promoting a positive climate for foreign investment.56 They also
agreed that transparent investment practices would attract more capital and investment,
which would work to the economic advantage of host states. Developed countries also
seemed to agree on the suggestion that inspiration for the multilateral framework for
investment should be sought from the GATS. The system of exemptions in the GATS
addressed the concerns of developing countries somewhat, through its flexibility
mechanism with respect to the national treatment standard.
56
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These views were opposed by developing countries on the grounds that though the
promises of the multilateral framework for investment are attainable, without adequate
control, they may have negative consequences on their economic development. The
views of developing countries are discussed below.
(b)

Developing Countries’ Perspectives

The growth of foreign direct investment may be viewed as an opportunity for developing
countries to encourage economic development. This is because, by it, they may tap into
economic resources and technology, and thus reduce poverty and create new jobs for
their economies.57 However, in order to retain this source of resources, developing
countries may be required to adjust their economies to meet the investment standards
required by foreign investors. Failure to do this may result in resources being diverted to
other countries willing to make such compromise.58 Hence, the competition for increased
capital is quite stiff among developing countries as the country that practices a liberalised
business economy will most likely receive more inflow of foreign direct investment. The
scope of the required adjustments, coupled with the need for developmental growth in a
particular economic sector, may be determine the extent of the compromise to be made,
and the willingness to open up markets to foreign direct investment.
57
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Developing countries are at different stages of economic development, which is one of
the reasons why opinions on the need for the inclusion of the national treatment standards
in the multilateral framework for investment vary.
i

Communications from Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico and South Africa

Fast growing developing countries like Brazil,59 Malaysia60 and Mexico61 supported the
multilateral framework for investment and the inclusion of the national treatment
standard, where it is fashioned after the GATS style on treatment standards. The GATS
style, as previously outlined, requires members to apply the national treatment standard
when commitments are made in that regard. It employs the positive list approach, which
permits members to choose the specific sectors in which national treatment would apply
or stipulate conditions under which it would apply. Some developing countries, like
Mexico, argued that this will grant them the necessary flexibility to determine the level of
foreign direct investment to embrace.62 Furthermore, it would provide them the necessary
policy space to regulate foreign investment and pursue national goals and interests.
Malaysia, for instance, devised its New Economic Policy to boost the equity participation
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of Malaysians in some sectors of its economy.63 The New Economic Policy limits the
proportion of equity that foreign investors may possess in various economic sectors. It
also stipulates that citizens should own a certain fraction of the shares of foreign
corporations. The New Economic Policy aims to safeguard the business of local
enterprises and companies. In 1970,
foreign investors held 70 percent of the entire share
equity of corporations in Malaysia. This percentage has
reduced to about 30 per cent, whilst the share of the
indigenous community has increased from two to around
30 percent.64
This “social engineering” policy may have contributed to the growth of the domestic
sector and, ultimately, socio-economic development in Malaysia. South Africa took the
position that, negotiations on a multilateral framework for investment should be framed
along the lines of the GATS, which allows for exceptions to the national treatment
standard through its specific obligation technique.65 This approach would provide the
necessary flexibility required by developing countries in pursuing national policies.66
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ii

Communications from Indonesia and Morocco

Indonesia expressed the opinion that although the non-discrimination principle is
essential, it should be applied in the appropriate context.67 Indonesia argued that a general
obligatory application of the national treatment standard is inappropriate for a multilateral
investment regime because it could hamper development interests. This is because the
flow of investments varies from the movement of goods; therefore, they argue that,
national treatment standards used under the multilateral trade regime cannot be applied
automatically to an investment regime.68 Indonesia argued that developing countries
should be able to employ investment restrictive measures that regulate the quantity of
investment received, control investor entry and exit, and ensure the allocation of foreign
investment based on economic needs. Indonesia stated that flexibility of the right to put
these measures in place and adjust them when necessary is vital to the economic interest
of developing countries. The dynamic nature of investment calls for dynamic investment
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restrictive measures.69 Indonesia further stated that the complementarities between
national development policies and a possible multilateral framework for investment
required further study.
Morocco shared the views of other developing countries. It said that the need to safeguard
domestic development goals is the first step in considering a multilateral framework for
investment.70 It suggested that the multilateral framework for investment could be
fashioned in the GATS style if certain adjustments were made to the GATS. It argued
that further study was necessary to fully understand the complexities between preserving
policy space and negotiating a multilateral framework on investment.71
On the other hand, some developing countries in Africa and Asia opposed the view that
the GATS style multilateral framework for investment would benefit host states on the
ground that the national treatment standard would harm the economic growth of
developing countries.
iii

Other Developing Countries

(a)

China, Cuba, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Hong Kong, China and
Egypt

A group of developing countries consisting of China, Cuba, India,72 Kenya, Pakistan and
Zimbabwe submitted a paper at the Doha Round,73 in which they emphasised that
69
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discussions and negotiations on the need for a multilateral framework on for investment
should be in consonance with the Doha Declaration which aims to balance the interests of
both host and home members of the WTO. These countries argued that this balance can
be achieved if members take into account the right of host states to regulate foreign
investment, and foreign investors undertake obligations that do not undercut the
development interest and policies of the host states.74 These arguments should form an
indispensable part of the Doha discussions on investment, as foreign investors should be
obliged to abide by the domestic laws and regulations of the host states and to engage in
investment practices that are in line with their economic goals and development
objectives.
These countries also made suggestions that domestic policy regarding ownership and
control of foreign investments. Their suggestions include: insisting on local equity
participation and granting priority to nationals in employment, training and promotion to
managerial posts. They asserted that this would enhance the developmental growth of
host states.75 The proposal by these countries may suggest that the national treatment
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standard should not be included in a multilateral framework for investment, as the
measures they advocated seem to ensure favourable treatment for national investors.
They viewed these discriminatory measures as a means of “retaining regulatory powers
and adequate policy space in relation to foreign investment and the foreign investors”.76
Another opposition to the quest for a multilateral framework for investment was from
Egypt. Egypt expressed the opinion that most developing countries lack the required level
of experience which would provide the necessary platform from which to better assess
the implications of a multilateral framework for investment for their development and
institutional policy goals. It pointed out that “technical assistance and capacity building in
respect of WTO agreements had not met the expectations of developing countries, which
were now facing severe implementation problems”.77 Egypt argued that the multilateral
framework for investment would worsen the problem of implementation if developing
countries sign the agreement without proper understanding of its effects and implications.
Therefore, there was a need for further consideration of the issues of non-discrimination
“from the perspective of how the development dimension of the Doha Round could be
reflected in appropriate flexibility for developing countries to regulate investment”. 78

76

Ibid at 7.

77

WTO, supra note 67 at 51.

78

Ibid.
87

Pakistan expressed the view79 that a multilateral framework for investment is unnecessary
because it would diminish the bargaining power of developing host countries when they
negotiated the inflow of foreign direct investment. Preservation of bargaining power is
provided by BITs due to its limited scope of operation between parties. As earlier
explained, this seems to be why BITs are preferred to regulate foreign direct investment
as opposed to a multilateral framework for investment.
The representative of Hong Kong, China stated that negotiated obligations for the
multilateral framework for investment should be flexible enough to accommodate the
specific development needs of each country since members of the WTO are at different
stages of economic development.80
b.

Communications from India

India’s position reflects the views of most low-income developing countries. As such it
should be considered in detail.
India, though a fast growing developing country, is a major opponent of the inclusion of
the national treatment standard in the multilateral framework for investment. India argued
that the GATS style is not an appropriate model upon which to design the multilateral
framework for investment because the GATS does not regulate investment per se, but
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merely investment through the supply of services.81 Furthermore, it argued that the
dynamic and uncertain nature of investment makes it difficult to transfer existing rules on
trade in services to investment.
India expressed the view that applying the non-discrimination principle in an
international investment agreement raises more complexities than including it in a trade
agreement. India argued that these complexities may be associated with the nature of
investment which involves the movement of capital through diverse channels. India took
the position that investment lacked the clear buyer-seller linkage, as is the case of goods
and services. There is no certainty of the source of capital, nor the manner in which the
capital will be retained and controlled by the host states. This is because the “money
market is more opaque, less predictable, far more subject to purely speculative
movements”.82 Investors may divert their capital at anytime, and this may result in an
unexpected heavy outflow of funds from the economy. This, it is argued, will have
damaging effects on the socio-economic development and stability of host states. Thus, it
is necessary for host states to preserve their discretionary power to regulate the inflow of
foreign investment.
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India also expressed the view that the application of non-discrimination principles on a
multilateral framework should be resisted, as it is only suitable for a trading regime and
not for investment. India argued that the application of the non-discrimination principle in
the GATS83 is essentially for the purpose of service supply and not investment. Although
the commercial mode of service supply in GATS84 involves foreign direct investment, it
is not a regulation of investment per se, but a means to facilitate service delivery. Also,
India noted that national treatment standard is only applied in the GATS where
commitments are made in that regard, which limits the scope of the non-discrimination
principle. Hence they argued that the GATS rules of national treatment should not be
considered as a model for the inclusion of the national treatment standard in the
multilateral framework for investment.
On the scope of the national treatment standard if included in the multilateral framework
for investment, India noted that traditionally, international law rules vest the power to
control and regulate investments in the host states, being an exercise of their sovereignty.
Therefore, suggestions that the national treatment standard be applied at the preestablishment stage would infringe on the sovereign rights of host states. India further
notes that apart from the NAFTA, no other investment agreement provides for national
treatment at the pre-establishment stages, except for non-binding agreements, such as the
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OECD Code for the Liberalization of Capital Movements, 1984.85 Consequently, there is
no basis to apply national treatment measures at the pre-establishment stage of
investment.
India concluded that “given the complex nature of capital flows/investments, application
of the non-discrimination principle as it exists in goods and services, to investment,
cannot be automatic”.86 Because, they argued, developing countries need to preserve their
right to screen and conduct foreign direct investment in manners that support their
domestic goals and interests.
iv.

Overview

The arguments put forward by developing countries made the case that if a multilateral
framework for investment is deemed necessary to ensure transparency and protection of
foreign investment, existing international trade rules of non-discrimination should not be
applied automatically due to the nature of investment. Also, the national treatment
standard should not be applied at the pre-investment stage, as this would encroach on host
state sovereignty. There seems to be agreement that a multilateral framework for
investment should consider the development needs of developing countries and make
room for flexibility to permit host states to pursue development goals. This may be
85
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achieved by allowing host states to determine the economic sectors to which, the national
treatment standard would apply. This approach is similar to the GATS approach which is
being canvassed by some developed countries, particularly the European Community.
The fears of developing countries is understandable, as most developed countries still
engage in foreign direct investment restriction practices in some specific areas of their
economies such as defence, transportation and banking. This suggests that the inflow of
foreign direct investment can only be beneficial to an economy if it is adequately
controlled and regulated by the host government. Measures for ensuring such regulation
may vary from country to country. Hence, introducing a multilateral framework for
investment without flexibility options for host states to strategize on how best they intend
to utilize potential inflow of foreign direct investment may not lead to the economic
growth desired by host states. This principle applies irrespective of whether the host state
is a developed or developing country.
Therefore, to provide the much needed investment security sought by developed
countries, and to allay the fears of policy space encroachment voiced by developing
countries, a multilateral framework for investment must be structured in a manner to
address the needs of all members of the WTO. The thesis argues that this can be achieved
through the GATS’s positive list approach, which would allow each member state to
dictate the pace at which it liberalises foreign direct investment in each economic sector.
In order to better appreciate the positions of develop and developing countries, and
proffer a workable solution that would be agreeable to both sides, the importance of a
multilateral framework for investment needs to be addressed. A major question that needs
92

to be answered is whether the multilateral framework for investment is really necessary.
The next section analyzes the possible advantages of a multilateral framework for
investment.
C. IS A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT NECESSARY?
The preceding section discussed the perspectives of developed and developing countries
on the need for a multilateral framework for investment. It is necessary to analyse the
potential benefits of multilateral framework for investment if it comes into existence.
This would provide a platform on which the thesis makes recommendations for the
establishment of a multilateral framework for investment in the next chapter.
According to World Development Report of 2005,87 there are four main arguments to
support the need for establishing a multilateral framework for investment. Scholars like
Benno Feranini88 have discussed and analyzed these arguments. First is the “transaction
costs argument”,89 which reflects the fact that foreign investors face huge transaction
costs and uncertainties when investing in host states because of the divergent national
rules and policies governing foreign direct investment. A multilateral framework for
investment may therefore reduce transaction costs and give room for increased allocation
of foreign direct investment.90
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The second view is the uncertainty argument which states that, a multilateral framework
for investment will reduce the risks of foreign investors when they deal with host states,
which are at presently at liberty to change investment policies as often as they wish, and
whose promises to reform unfavourable investment rules may be unreliable. The
multilateral framework for investment will therefore boost the confidence of foreign
investors in host states reformation processes, by ensuring predictability in investment
rules. This would presumably result in increased flow of foreign direct investment to host
states.91 Hoekman and Saggi’s statement on the role of international agreements
buttresses this view:
…an international agreement may serve as a mechanism
through

which

government

makes

irrevocable

commitments and ‘guarantees’ against policy reversals,
thereby anchoring expectations of investors.92
A multilateral framework for investment would provide a form of binding commitment
which host states cannot breach without consequences. This commitment prevents host
states from amending their policies in such a way that would legalise direct or indirect
expropriation of foreign investments, which operates to the detriment of foreign investors
who have invested huge sums of moneys. A multilateral framework for investment would
therefore provide necessary investment security.
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Another argument justifying the need for multilateral framework for investment is
founded in politics. A multilateral framework for investment would enable governments
to engage in national reformatory practices which would bring their domestic investment
policies into conformity with their multilateral framework for investment obligations. The
multilateral framework for investment would make it difficult for host states to restrict
the inflow of foreign direct investment under the guise of upholding national policies.
Another argument is international policy spill-over, which occurs when host countries’
foreign direct investment policies have negative effects on other countries.

The

multilateral framework for investment would increase global welfare by ensuring that
domestic regulations which restrict and impede foreign direct investment at the global
level and cause investment distortions in the distribution of investment are eliminated.
This would be achieved through the provision of general investment obligations which
should be complied with by parties to the agreement.
Overall, a multilateral framework for investment would enhance the investment climate
in host states, particularly developing countries. In turn, this will lead to increased
inflows of foreign direct investment and greater economic growth and development.93 A
transparent and predictable investment regime would attract more foreign investment,
thereby creating jobs and expanding markets in host states. However, the fears of
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countries like India is genuine as the inflow of foreign direct control must be adequately
controlled to reap its benefits.94
From the foregoing, it is clear that the multilateral framework for investment will
coordinate and harmonise the various bilateral and regional investment rules which
currently regulate foreign direct investment. This will bring predictability and
comprehensiveness to foreign direct investment rules. The downside for developing
countries is that the multilateral framework for investment may require high investor
protection standards and introduce obligations prohibiting the use of restrictions on the
free flow of foreign direct investment. These standards may limit the freedom of host
states to provide favourable investment atmosphere for local investors. Also, it could lead
to excessive foreign control over vital socio-economic areas if developing countries grant
increased market access to foreign investors. However, the benefits outweigh the negative
effects of the multilateral framework for investment, particularly the fear of policy space
encroachment of host states, and the fear of developing countries can be allayed through
the GATS-style approach, which permits members to decide the extent of their national
treatment and market access obligations.
CONCLUSION
A multilateral framework on investment would provide comprehensive and harmonized
international investment standards, though its advantages are accompanied by potential
94
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disadvantageous implications if the multilateral framework for investment regime is not
adequately regulated. This means that it is the scope and effect of such an agreement that
will determine what may be the more favourable approach open to developing countries.
The foregoing analysis shows that developed and developing countries share some
common grounds on the need for a multilateral framework for investment, which is to
ensure security, stability, predictability and transparency in the regulation of foreign
transactions, as canvassed by the developed countries. However, it is the fear of
developing countries that the investment guarantees of the multilateral framework for
investment may infringe on their sovereign right to impose investment regulatory
measures to protect their policy space and to further the development of their economies.
Thus, it is the scope of obligations of the multilateral framework for investment, that is
the subject of contention between both sides.
Otherwise, the developed and developing countries agree that the multilateral framework
for investment could be fashioned after the GATS, with certain amendments which would
increase the power of the developing host states to preserve their policy space and
development objectives. Apart from India, most of the developing countries support this
conclusion, though some have requested further study and technical assistance to enable
them understand the full implication of the multilateral framework for investment on their
economies.
The developed country perspective, particularly that of the European Community which
suggested a GATS style approach to the multilateral framework for investment, seems to
be a fair recommendation, considering the fear of developing countries on their need to
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preserve policy space. The GATS style may provide the necessary flexibility required by
the developing countries to pursue their national policies. However, the positive effects of
such flexibility vis a vis the need to encourage the inflow of foreign direct investment
remains to be ascertained. Since the GATS is the model agreement for such provisions, a
discussion of the provisions and operation of GATS is essential. The next chapter looks
at the operation of GATS and its success in regulating trade in services. The discussion
proposes that the GATS is an appropriate model upon which the multilateral framework
for investment should be modelled in order to effectively regulate foreign direct
investment, while preserving preserve the

regulatory rights of

host states.
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CHAPTER FOUR:

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT STANDARDS IN

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES: A MODEL FOR A
MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT
INTRODUCTION
As explained in chapter 2, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was established by the
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in 1995. The aim of the WTO is to regulate and
liberalize world trade by improving market access and fostering economic growth among
its members. The WTO Agreement established several agreements to achieve its
liberalization goals with respect to trade, though no agreement was established to
regulate and liberalise foreign investment.
The growth of foreign direct investment over the years has fuelled deliberations on the
need to provide a multilateral framework for investment. The need to create a stable,
transparent and predictable environment for foreign investment regime plays a major role
in this effort. However, fears of the effects of uncontrolled inflows of foreign direct
investment are a source of concern to host states as discussed in the preceding chapters
of this thesis. Finding a balance between the desire for a comprehensive investment
agreement, and the desire of host states to retain control over the inflow of foreign
investment, is of utmost importance to making progress towards establishing a
multilateral framework for investment.
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Lessons from past attempts to create a framework for investment 1 made it obvious that a
successful attempt could only arise from a compromise between developed and
developing countries, as their divergent opinions on the subject have contributed to the
stalled progress in establishing such a framework. The World Trade Organization
(WTO) set out to find a balance on this issue, and investment was included on the agenda
of the Doha Development Round in 2001.2 A working group was set up in 2001 to
deliberate on the relationship between trade and investment,3 and to formulate modalities
for negotiations on establishing a multilateral framework for investment.
As discussed in chapter 3, deliberations on the establishment of the multilateral
framework for investment among members of the WTO were met with stiff opposition
from developing countries. These countries were of the opinion that a multilateral
framework for investment would unduly constrain their rights to regulate and control the
inflow of foreign direct investment. Also, they were fearful that the agreement would
interfere with their desire to pursue domestic policies, as the agreement may prohibit the
1
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use of restrictive investment mechanisms. Developed countries, on the other hand,
argued that a multilateral framework for investment was necessary to ensure investment
protection, and to provide the much needed stability and predictability in the investment
regime. They argued that existing WTO multilateral agreements on trade, services and
intellectual property had facilitated the growth and expansion of those industries, and a
similar regulatory environment was needed for investment.
Both sides in this debate have genuine concerns which must be considered before a
multilateral framework for investment can be successfully established. Without the
multilateral framework for investment, foreign investors may be exposed to the whims
and caprices of host states government who are at liberty to change investment policies
at will. Sudden changes and variations in investment policies may work to the detriment
of unsuspecting foreign investors who may have invested heavily in a particular
economic sector in the hope of reaping benefits within a speculated period. It may be
argued that bilateral investment agreements already provide this security. However, these
do not offer comprehensive protection as host governments can avoid the application of
bilateral investment commitments under the guise of a change in government policy. A
multilateral investment agreement would provide a check on such practices. It is a
common principle of international law that international agreements are binding
irrespective of the laws and policies of the host state where the host state is a party to that
agreement.4 Therefore, a multilateral framework for investment would safeguard foreign
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investments, providing an enabling atmosphere for increased flows of foreign direct
investment.
But it could also be argued that the reservations of developing countries on the effect of a
multilateral framework for investment are well founded. Though developing countries
desire foreign direct investment to enhance economic growth and technological
advancement, its reception must be adequately controlled, otherwise, the anticipated
benefits may not be reaped. Flooding the domestic economy with foreign multinationals
may inhibit the growth of domestic companies, as the competition could be
insurmountable. In order to even the playing field, developing host states may require
favourable policies for domestic investors, and put in place certain mechanism, to
increase the participation of domestic companies in the economy.
Having consideration for all of these factors, the way forward to establish a multilateral
framework on investment is to ensure a balance between the positive and negative
impacts of the agreement. This can be achieved by ensuring that the multilateral
framework for investment accounts for the desire of developed countries vis a vis the
fears of developing countries. A workable solution may be to model the multilateral
framework for investment after the GATS5 as suggested by the European Community
and others.
The GATT is one of the multilateral agreements enacted by the WTO to regulate trade in
services. The agreement was necessitated by the considerable increase in the demand for
5
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services, resulting in a move from trade in goods to trade in services. The purpose of the
GATS is to ensure the liberalization of trade in services by securing a balance of rights
and obligations, and giving due respect to national policy objectives.6 Furthermore, the
GATS recognises the right of Members, particularly the need of developing countries, to
regulate and pursue national policy objectives which would promote economic growth
by increasing production and employment opportunities. This is achieved through the
four modes of service delivery provided in the GATS, namely: cross-border supply,
consumption abroad, commercial presence, and natural presence.
A key function of the GATS is its regulation of foreign direct investment. In the absence
of a multilateral investment agreement, GATS is the most comprehensive agreement
related to investment that currently exists under the auspices of the WTO. The GATS
regulates foreign direct investment through its provision on “commercial presence” as a
mode of service delivery. Among other provisions, the GATS regulates foreign direct
investment through its provision on market access and non-discrimination. The nondiscrimination principle has two major components: the most-favoured-nation rule, and
the national treatment standard. The national treatment standard requires members of the
WTO to provide equal treatment to both domestic and foreign investors in services.7 This
obligation is, however, subjected to exceptions on account of countries’ reservations
based on domestic policy priorities.8
6
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The first part of this chapter assesses the operation of the GATS and its scope of
obligations with particular emphasis on the liberalization of foreign direct investment,
while the second part analyses the benefits of the GATS and its potential as a possible
model for the multilateral framework for investment.
This chapter demonstrates that the GATS is a workable model for the multilateral
framework for investment because while ensuring the regulation and liberalization of
trade in services, it also provides flexibility for host states to control and direct their
economic growth in line with their interests and goals. This is achieved through its
provision of a positive list Schedule of Specific Commitments which permits members to
determine which economic sectors they wish to expose to national treatment obligations.
An investment agreement of this nature would allay the fears of developing countries and
also satisfy the investment security needs of developed countries. A multilateral
framework for investment fashioned after the GATS would lead to progress in the quest
to enact a multilateral framework for investment.
For a proper appreciation of the GATS style as a model agreement for investment, it is
necessary to provide an overview of its structure and the obligations it requires of WTO
members. This is discussed in section A. Section B then provides an analysis of the
operation of GATS regarding the regulation of foreign direct investment, and discusses
its flexibility and benefits.
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A. OVERVIEW OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES9
The growth of services in world trade and foreign direct investment may have
contributed to the emergence of the GATS in 1995. Although a service agreement was
not originally on the agenda of the Uruguay Round negotiations, it was introduced by
proponents largely made up of developed countries, with the United States in the lead.
Developing countries, such as India and Brazil, were of the view that the regulation of
services should be left to domestic regulation and that multilateral rules on services
would undermine and restrict their rights to maintain policy goals aimed at achieving
developmental objectives.10 Despite opposition, negotiations on an agreement for
services were undertaken and the Agreement was signed by WTO members to ensure
liberalization of trade in services. The aim was,
to establish a multilateral framework of principles and
rules for trade in services with a view to the expansion of
such trade under conditions of transparency and
progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting the
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economic growth of all trading partners and the
development of developing countries.11
According to the WTO, the main objectives of the GATS is to “create a credible and
reliable system of international trade rules; ensure fair and equitable treatment of all
participants stimulate economic activity through guaranteed policy bindings; and
promote trade and development through progressive liberalization”. 12 The GATS seeks
to achieve these objectives through the several obligations provided therein. This section
considers the structure and obligations of GATS which includes general, conditional, and
specific obligations. It also discusses GATS’ schedule of commitments and its
progressive liberalization goal.
I.

Structure of the General Agreement on Trade in Services

The GATS is divided into three main sections. The first section sets out the framework
of the agreement, including its general principles and rules. The second section contains
annexes for specific limitations for commitments in certain service sectors, and the third
section provides a list of the national schedules to which members state their specific
market access commitments. The GATS is made up 12 classified sectors divided into
161 service activities. Trade services contemplated by the GATS include: business,

11

GATS, supra note 5, preamble.

12

WTO, The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objectives, Coverage
and Disciplines, online: WTO
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm> (Retrieved February 14,
2011).
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telecommunication, education, health, transport, environmental, maritime, energy and
financial services.
Article I of GATS provides that the agreement applies to measures taken by Members
affecting trade in services at the central, regional, and local government levels, as well as
by non-governmental bodies to whom regulatory powers have been delegated.13 It does
not define “services”, but clearly exempts services provided in the exercise of
governmental authority from its contemplation of “services”.14 As well, that services
supplied in the “exercise of governmental authority” includes those that are done neither
on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers.15
Although the GATS does not give an express definition of “services”, it provides for four
modes of service delivery that gives an understanding of the concept of “services”. The
first mode is cross-border supply. This does not necessitate the movement of either the
provider or end user of the service. The service is provided across the border through
mail or any other method. The second mode of supply is consumption abroad, where the
consumers go to a different country to enjoy the service. An example is a tourist who
goes to another country to enjoy a service. The third mode is by commercial presence,

13

GATS, supra note 5 at article 1.
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The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO defined the word “services” in Canada-

Certain Measures Affecting Automotive Industries (Complaint by the European
Communities and Japan), (2000) WTO Doc. WT/DS142/AB/R, WT/DS139/AB/R
(Appellate Body Report) at 157.
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where a service supplier sets up a corporation or venture, or obtains foreign ownership of
an extant company in a foreign nation, in a bid to supply services in that nation. The
fourth mode is by the presence of natural persons,16 where the provider of the service
goes personally to another country to render his services.
The operation of the GATS is enabled through the several obligations it stipulates.
Adherence to, and performance of the obligations by member states are intent to ensure
the achievement of GATS’ objective, which is to liberalize trade in services while
allowing for flexibility in the pursuit of domestic obligations. These obligations are
discussed next.
II.

Scope of Obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services

The GATS regulates trade in services through three sets of obligations: general
obligations, conditional obligations and specific obligations.17 General obligations apply
directly to all measures affecting trade in services and bind every member of the WTO,
regardless of sectoral commitments. This is usually referred to as the “top-down”
approach.18 Conditional obligations are usually qualified and only apply when certain
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GATS, supra note 5 at article 1 (2) (a)–(d).
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of Law, 2009).
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Policy Perspective, Globalization, Trade and Health Working Papers Series, online:
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conditions are fulfilled. Specific obligations19 only apply to those sectors that a member
has committed to in its list of national schedules. The extent of application of the
obligations listed in the schedule is determined by each member state. This approach is
known as the bottom-up approach.20 The general obligations will be discussed now.
1.1

General Obligations

There are various general obligations in GATS, but the most important are the mostfavoured-nation principle, and the transparency principle. These I next discuss.
(a)

The Most Favoured Nation Principle

The GATS provides for two non-discrimination principles, the most-favoured-nation
principle and the national treatment standard.21 These principles seek to ensure that
barriers to free trade in services through discriminatory practices among members of the
WTO are eliminated or, at least, greatly reduced. The most-favoured-nation principle is
the core general obligation in the GATS.
It was imperative to provide non-discrimination principle because of the protectionism
practiced by various countries, and which had stifled the free flow of trade in services.

<http://whqlibdoc.who.int/gats/GATS_Legal_Review_eng.pdf>. (Retrieved February
14, 2010).
19

An explanation of the specific commitment mechanism is provided on page 114.

20

M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (New York: Cambridge

University Press, Grotius Publications, 1994) 269 at 300.
21

The national treatment standard is discussed in later parts of this thesis.
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The GATS provided an opportunity to deal with this cancer that had eaten deep into the
fabric of both trade and service liberalization. The most-favoured-nation principle
requires that each Member shall “accord immediately and unconditionally to services
and service suppliers of any other Member, treatment no less favourable than that it
accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country”. 22 Members of the
WTO are not allowed to discriminate among one another and are obliged to accord all
member states the same treatment regarding trade in services. Hence, where a service
treatment is granted to one member, all member states are immediately entitled to similar
treatment regarding like services.
The most-favoured-nation principle applies to all measures of trade in services and cuts
across all service sectors. The only permitted most-favoured-nation exemption is
provided under the Annex on Article II Exemptions23 which allows member states to
exempt certain service sectors from the most-favoured-nation treatment for a period not
exceeding ten years after accession to the WTO. As stated above, this is known as the
“top-down” approach, as the most-favoured-nation principle is generally binding on all
members and applies to all service sectors and measures relating to trade in services. 24
This provision allows for flexibility, and enables member states to adjust their domestic
laws and regulation to comply with WTO obligations.

22

GATS, supra note 5 at article II.

23

GATS, supra note 5 at article II (2).

24

Fidler & GATS Legal Review Team for the World Health Organization, supra note 18

at 4.
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(b)

Transparency Principle

This principle requires member states to provide information on all measures that affect
their obligations under the GATS. This is a disclosure principle which brings existing
national laws, regulations, administrative guidelines and policies of a WTO member
which affect trade in services to the knowledge of all other member states.25 Member
states are also required to provide information on new, or a change in existing national
laws and regulations which affect their GATS commitments upon its entry into force, or
upon demand by member states. An avenue for such inquiry must be provided by
member states within two years of the entering into force of the WTO Agreement. 26 A
publication of commitments to international agreements relating to trade in services is
also required.
Beyond the general obligations in GATS, are its conditional obligations which, though
general in nature, are limited in their application due to the several conditions put in
place by the GATS. I consider these obligations now.
1.2

Conditional Obligations

The conditional obligations under the GATS relate to domestic regulations which affect
trade in services, economic integration and monopolies.

25

GATS, supra note 5at article III.

26

Mary Footer, “The International Regulation of Trade in Services following

Completion of the Uruguay Round” (1995) 29 Int’l L 453.
111

(a)

Domestic Regulation

Article VI of GATS recognises the sovereignty of member states by acknowledging their
right to domestic regulations regarding national policies. However, where specific
commitments regarding certain sectors are undertaken in GATS, the domestic
regulations which relate to trade in services are required to be administered in a
reasonable, objective and impartial manner in order not to constitute a barrier to trade in
services.27 The GATS also requires member states to set up judicial, arbitral or
administrative tribunals or procedures to provide for review and grant of remedies for
administrative decisions that adversely affect trade in services. This process should be
transparent and not more burdensome than necessary.28
Members are, however, exempted from this obligation where it conflicts with domestic
constitutional requirements. The GATS ensures that while member states can apply
domestic measures, such as qualification requirements, technical standards and licensing
requirements in the grant of market access, such measures should not constitute a barrier,
nor nullify specific commitments made in their national schedules.29 This encourages the
liberalization of trade in services, at the same time as they are free to make domestic
regulations on services and the supply of services.

27

GATS, supra note 5 at article VI.
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Ibid at article VI (4).
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Ibid at article VI (5).
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(b)

Economic Integration

Article V of GATS permits member states to integrate their economies by entering into
agreements that promote service liberalization covering substantial service sectors and
which eliminates discriminatory measures. Doing this helps to harmonise the regulatory
framework of member states, and furthers service liberalization.30
(c)

Monopolies

Although the monopoly rights of service suppliers seem to impede free trade in services,
it is not prohibited in GATS. Monopoly rights are, however, limited by GATS
obligations which require member states to ensure that monopoly suppliers within their
jurisdictions do not act contrary to their obligations under its specific commitments.31
Furthermore, member states have an obligation to prevent a monopoly supplier from
competing outside the scope of its monopoly rights, and from abusing its monopoly
position in a manner inconsistent with such a member’s commitments under GATS. 32
The general and conditional obligations earlier discussed reflect obligations which are
binding on all members of the WTO. However, there are also specific obligations in the

30

An example of such agreement is the North American Free Trade Agreement Between

the Government of Canada, The Government of Mexico and the Government of the
United States of America, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2, 32 ILM 289.
31

Ibid at article VIII (1) & (2).

32
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Telecommunications Services (Complaints by the United States) (2004) WTO Doc.
WT/DS204/R (Panel Report).
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GATS, the application of which is largely left to the discretion of member states. These
are referred to as specific commitments and they are treated below.
1.3

Specific Commitments

Specific commitments are the GATS mechanism that allows countries to “tailor-make”
their commitments under national treatment and market access. It is important to
understand this in order to apply this mechanism to an agreement on foreign direct
investment. The mechanism works as follows:
i. All countries are obliged to have a Schedule of Commitments in Services
ii. If a country enters a service sector into its Schedule of Commitments, then all
provisions of the GATS are binding on that sector unless the country has listed
specific limitations to its commitments under “market access” (Article XVI) and
“national treatment” (Article XVII). Without this limitations being scheduled, all
provisions of market access and national treatment will be obligatory and binding
on the country.
iii. Such limitations are negotiated with trade partners.
(a)

National Treatment

The national treatment standard is related to the most-favoured-nation principle. Article
XVII of GATS mandates member states to grant the same treatment to foreign and
domestic services and service suppliers. Hence, foreign services and service providers
ought not to be treated less favourably than domestic services and service providers. This
non-discrimination principle ensures that domestic service providers are not granted
favourable conditions to the disadvantage of foreign suppliers. The National treatment
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standard guarantees equal treatment regarding “like services” and “like service
suppliers” and makes sure that service competitors have equal access to a commercial
environment.33 The national treatment standard applies to sectors to which commitments
have been made by members in their list of specific-sector schedules.
(b)

Market Access

Similar to the national treatment standard is the market access principle. This states that
“each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member
treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations and
conditions agreed and specified in its schedule”.34 These limitations include:
limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms
of maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or
the total value of individual or aggregate foreign
investment, limitations on the total number of natural
persons that may be employed in a particular service
sector or that a service supplier may employ and who are
necessary for, and directly related to, the supply of a
specific service in the form of numerical quotas or the
requirement of an economic needs test and, measures
which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or

33

Further discussions on the national treatment standard will be provided in subsequent

sections of this thesis.
34

GATS, supra note 5 at article XVI.
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joint venture through which a service supplier may supply
a service.35
This principle grants a member state the freedom to determine and control what foreign
services and service suppliers to receive in its domestic market in accordance with its
market access commitments in the GATS schedule. Markus Krajewski is of the view that
the obligation to accord foreign services and service suppliers “treatment no less
favourable” does not require such treatment to be similar to treatment granted to
domestic services and service suppliers. It is limited to the treatment standard stated in
each member’s commitment and is put in place to ensure that members comply with
their obligations, notwithstanding the treatment standard provided to domestic services
and services suppliers.36 Member states can, thus, list the above limitations in their
commitment schedule whether or not they are discriminatory.37 Furthermore, full market
access commitment means that members are prevented from employing Article XVI
measures even if they do not discriminate between foreign and domestic and foreign
services and service suppliers.38 In essence, the market access principle reduces non-
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GATS, supra note 5 at article XVI (20).
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Markus Krajewski, National Regulation and the Liberalization of Trade in Services:
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discrimination measures which restrict free trade in services. This differentiates the
market access principle from the national treatment standard.
The national treatment standard in GATS only applies after market access has been
granted; hence, it applies to the further treatment of foreign services and service
suppliers after reception to the domestic market.39 The ability to control the effect of the
market access principle through the conditions and limitations specified in the
commitments made by each member in its schedule helps to retain domestic regulatory
autonomy.
As noted above, specific obligations only apply to sectors where specific commitments
have been made. These commitments are stated in the Schedule of Specific
Commitments provided by GATS.40 The schedule helps to ensure transparency and
predictability in trade in services. A cursory look at a member state’s schedule of specific
commitments gives insight to other members, and assists them in making trade and
investment decisions when dealing with one another. These commitments are discussed
next.
1.4

Commitments under the General Agreement on Services

A requirement of GATS is that member states have a Schedule of Specific Commitments
in respect of the four modes of service supply. This Schedule lists the commitments of
each member regarding the market access principle and the national treatment obligation
39

Footer, supra note 25 at 472.

40

GATS, supra note 5 at article XX.
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in respect of various economic service sectors and sub-sectors. Members are permitted to
state limitations, qualifications and conditions which determine the extent of application
of the market access and national treatment obligation regarding the specific sectors they
have indentified.41 The GATS does not mandate commitments in any specific sector, and
member states have discretionary rights to determine the level of liberalization of a
service sector based on national policy. Members may decide to be fully bound by GATS
obligations in certain sectors, while deciding to be free of the obligations in other sectors.
They may also decide to be bound to a certain extent in other sectors. Members are
required to comply with the non-discrimination principle in sectors to which they make
full commitments. Negotiation on the schedule of specific commitments may be viewed
as favourable to developing countries, as it recognises their developmental inadequacies
and provides a slow liberalization option which can be achieved through a gradual
increase of commitments in their schedules.
It is important to note that once commitments are made in certain service sectors, they
have general application, extend to all members of the WTO, and no form of
discrimination is permitted. GATS commitments also have impacts on domestic
regulations, as members are expected to bring their domestic regulations in compliance
with their GATS commitments. Hence, commitments in the national schedule must be
made with caution.42 Although members are permitted to modify or withdraw

41

GATS, supra note 5 at articles XVI, XVII and XX.

42
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commitments after three years of making them, withdrawal or modification triggers
compensation where it affects the benefits enjoyed by another member, and negotiation
on compensation is requested by the affected member.43 Such compensations are granted
on an most-favoured-nation basis.
Against the backdrop of these various obligations and commitments under GATS, the
next sub-section considers the aim of GATS to ensure further liberalization of trade in
services.
1.5

Progressive Liberalization

The GATS aims at securing higher levels of service liberalization through successive
rounds of negotiations to promote the interests of members and to achieve a balance of
rights and obligations through the reduction or elimination of barriers to free trade in
services. It stipulates that the interest of developing countries should be considered
during such negotiations by respecting their national policy goals and allowing for
flexibility in their making of GATS commitments.
The above discussion represents a brief overview of the GATS framework and its
operation. This provides the necessary background and information on the scope of
GATS, and offers grounds on which to make arguments and draw conclusions regarding
the use of GATS as a model agreement after which to fashion the multilateral framework

Gambling and Betting (Complaints by Antigua), (2005) WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R
(Appellate Body Report).
43

GATS, supra note 5 at article XXI.
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for investment. As indicated, the focus of this chapter is how GATS obligations,
particularly the national treatment and market access obligations, could provide a
workable multilateral framework for the regulation of investment, it is imperative to
analyse the liberalising role played by the GATS’ provisions discussed above. The next
section gives a brief analysis of the regulation of foreign direct investment, and assesses
the flexibility of the GATS’ regime in relation to investment in services. It also considers
the benefits of the GATS’s style in providing a framework for an investment agreement.
B.

Scope of Foreign Direct Investment Obligations in the General Agreement on
Trade in Services

Background information on foreign direct investment and its place in host state
economic development was provided in Chapter 2.44 The GATS recognises foreign
direct investment as a means of promoting economic growth in developing countries. It
makes provision for foreign direct investment through its third mode of service delivery,
and the scope of GATS’s in the liberalization of foreign direct investment is now
considered.
I.

Scope of Regulation

As previously noted, commercial presence is a mode of service delivery. Commercial
presence is applicable to foreign direct investment, as certain services, such as banking,
can only be rendered through commercial presence. In a bid to encourage service
liberalization, facilitate and eradicate barriers to foreign direct investment regarding trade
services, GATS, like Article III of the GATT, stipulates a minimum standard of

44

Chapter 2 Section B at pages 35-39.
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treatment of foreign investors by the host state in a bid to protect its economic interests.
It is important to note that foreign direct investment here refers only to services and the
supply of services.
The national treatment standard is provided in Article XVII of the GATS. It mandates
each member of the WTO to accord services and service suppliers of any other member,
treatment no less favourable than what it accords to its own like services and service
suppliers.45 The national treatment standard is only applicable to “like services” or
“service suppliers”46. The rule is only applicable where the foreign investor has
commercial presence in the host state, and is involved in the delivery of the similar
services, and supplies a service similar to that of the domestic company.
Under the GATS, “Identical treatment of domestic and foreign investors shall be
considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of
45
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services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service
suppliers of any other Member”.47 This is often known as de jure and de facto
discrimination.48 This provision aims to prevent discrimination and to guarantee equal
competition between foreign investors and domestic investors. This provision was
interpreted by a WTO panel to include non-discrimination measures which do not
directly affect trade in services but are able to distort trade.49 The probable risk of loss of
capital returns faced by foreign investors in host states is thus, greatly reduced. Foreign
investors are subject to the laws of the host state and the national treatment standard
prevents the government from enacting laws and rules that will have harmful effects on
the investment of foreigners. The laws could provide market incentives to domestic
investors without proportionate provisions for foreign investors, limitations on the
importation of some equipment required for service delivery, stringent licensing
requirements and technological standards, and impose discriminatory tax levies on
foreign investors,50 etc.
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The above provisions of GATS were put in place to liberalize trade in services and to
prevent discrimination between domestic and foreign trade in services. Although they are
advantageous and rigid, flexibility is introduced by its provisions on the Schedule of
Commitment, to which is considered next.
II.

Flexibility in the General Agreement on Trade in Services

The market access and national treatment standards are made flexible by the provision of
Article XX. This provision allows a member state to “set out in a schedule, the specific
commitments it undertakes under Part III of this Agreement”51. It excludes Part III from
the general obligations applicable to all trade in services provided in GATS.52 This
means that market access and national treatment apply only if a Member makes
commitments in this regard. Delimatsis is of the view that the market access and national
treatment standards are founded on a positive lists approach and are only applicable to
specific sectors and modes of supply based on a Member’s commitments.53
Therefore, a member may limit its GATS’ commitment by stating the condition under
which the national treatment or market access principle will apply in certain sectors of its
economy. It could even state that it is unbound by the national treatment standard.
51

GATS, supra note 5 at article XX (1).
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Canada’s health care policy, for instance, exempts the application of the national
treatment standard to the delivery of health care services. Canada is, therefore, permitted
to discriminate between foreign and domestic services and service providers who supply
like services in the healthcare sector. There may be several rationales for this restriction,
namely, the need to make available inexpensive health care to Canadian residents, and to
guarantee the distribution of wealth between the rich and the poor.54 Canada’s health
policy gives a clear example of practices in other WTO member states. Many member
states restrict foreign direct investment in sectors such as telecommunications, finance,
transportation, electricity and defence.
The GATS further provides that members may withdraw or modify any commitment in
their schedule upon giving three months notice to the WTO Council on Trade in
Services.55 However, the withdrawal or modification may require making other trade
compromises where they affect the benefits of other members under the Agreement.56
Article XIII controls the effective eradication of foreign direct investment barriers in
GATS. The reason for this is that many member states have put in place restrictions on
the application of market access or national treatment in regard to service delivery under
54
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mode three.57 Most member states implement national policies that restrict the free
access of foreign services and service providers to domestic markets. An example of
such policies is the limitation of foreign participation in certain economic sectors.
According to Stephen Golub,
majority domestic ownership requirements include airlines
in the European Community and North American
countries, telecommunications in Japan, and coastal and
freshwater shipping in the United States. Exclusive
domestic ownership is also often applied to natural
resource sectors with the aim of giving citizens access to
the associated rents. For example, foreign ownership is
banned in the fishing and energy sectors in Iceland, and in
the oil sector in Mexico.58
These reservations may be based on what significance a member state places on a sector,
such as the economic importance of that sector. As well, to a reasonable extent, it may
determine the echelon of commitment it is prepared to make to liberalize that sector.
There may be several reasons for these restrictions. They include: the desire to safeguard
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domestic policies; the need to prevent environmental degradation; to ensure national
security; to guarantee the welfare of residents;59 and to prevent extensive control by
foreign investors. The reservations approach limits liberalization of foreign direct
investment in trade in services. The scope of liberalization is controlled by national
policies which limit the application of the stated principles to the areas reserved.
The GATS allows reservations from specific commitments to promote flexibility in
GATS rules and to increase the participation of developing countries in GATS
negotiations. This position is supported by arguments that member states “should have
sufficient policy space to pursue regulatory, developmental, prudential, and other goals
in the public interest.”60 The role of GATS in the liberalization of trade in services is
commendable and similar success can be achieved with the multilateral framework for
investment if it is fashioned after the GATS. An analysis of the benefits of the GATS’s
style for the regulation of foreign direct investment follows.
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III.

Benefits of the General Agreement on Trade in Services Model for
Investment

The main objectives of the GATS are to ensure transparency, stability and liberalization
of services.61 These goals are sought to be achieved through various provisions in the
Agreement. According to Oliver Hilger, the GATS has three broad advantages, namely,
“increased competition, increased market access, and predictability and transparency”.62
This thesis argues that similar benefits can be achieved through the multilateral
framework for investment if the GATS style approach, discussed in section II of this
chapter, is embraced and applied in the regulation of foreign direct investment.
Oliver Hilger argued that service liberalization can be achieved through an effective
competitive system. This thesis argues that this can also be achieved in an investment
regime because competition in the investment industry encourages increased foreign
direct investment, faster innovations, efficient technology transfer, lower prices, better
delivery of investment services, different investment choices for host states, willingness
of foreign investors to negotiate on terms of operation, and increased bargaining power
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of host states to determine which investments to embrace. These benefits lead to greater
economic performance and developmental growth.
Increased market access also plays a role in guaranteeing effective market competition.
An optimised application of Article XVI of GATS, fashioned in the context of
investment would ensure the free inflow of foreign direct investment to member states,
particularly developing countries, and provide the necessary access to sophisticated
foreign investors. The competitive strength of foreign multinational companies could
then help to ignite the economic passion of domestic markets, and drive them to increase
quality and output in order to measure up to the standards provided by foreign investors.
This could enhance product and process innovations, including easy access to economic
development.63
An example of this is the telecommunications industry in Nigeria. Prior to 2001,
residents had no access to mobile telephone lines and were hugely dependent on land
lines. This seemed satisfactory and the situation did not appear to hamper effective
communication until the arrival of a multinational telecommunications company; MTN
Nigeria (MTN) in 2001. This investment, worth billions of dollars, brought about huge
transformation in the industry, as mobile devices were introduced into the system. Soon
it became a crucial factor in the day to day living of individuals and businesses. Initially,
only a few could afford to obtain a mobile device due to the cost of securing it and in
view of the cost of the rechargeable cards needed to place calls. Hence, ease of
63
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communication for residents, which was the agenda of the government, could not be
achieved as only the wealthy could afford the mobile devices. Consequently, the foreign
multinational enjoyed monopoly of the industry and was not in a hurry to reduce the
prices it charged. However, in 2003, a domestic company, Globacom Nigeria Limited,
ventured into the same industry and was able to provide mobile devices at affordable
prices. This presented the much needed competition to make MTN reduce its prices.
Now, almost everyone in Nigeria has a mobile device, as there are so many
telecommunication companies in Nigeria that provide mobile services at affordable
prices. It seems that the benefit of opening up the telecommunication industry to foreign
investors was only realised when effective competition was introduced into the system.
The overall outcome has been increased employment opportunities, technological and
infrastructural advancement.
The above example demonstrates that developing host states can be inspired by foreign
investors to engage in new activities similar to those in which they invest. It also reflects
the fact that foreign direct investment, though necessary for economic development,
should be designed to benefit host states by creating the right atmosphere to encourage
local investors to acquire the necessary skills and technology.
The GATS provides predictability and transparency in the service industry. Its provisions
on transparency and the requirement of listing for general and specific commitments in
the national schedule of member states,64 provides information and helps to keep
potential foreign investors abreast with each other’s commitments regarding several
64

GATS, supra note 5 at article XX.
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economic sectors and sub-sectors. The GATS provisions aim to secure transparent, stable
and predictable conditions for long-term cross-border investment,65 which would
contribute to the growth foreign direct investment. Similar provisions in the multilateral
framework for investment would lead to increased foreign direct investment. Foreign
investors will not be left in the dark regarding a member state’s investment policy and
will be able to predict the market, thereby influencing the host state’s foreign investment
decisions. Such growth of foreign direct investment would, no doubt, lead to increased
economic growth in member states through the flow of capital, managerial skills,
technological transfer and increase in production.
Also, the GATS approach, if applied in the multilateral framework for investment,
should include the positive list approach to specific obligations. As stated above,
obligations, such as the national treatment standard, only apply to those sectors that a
member has committed to in its list of national schedules. This approach allows host
states to determine which areas of their economy they wish to open to foreign direct
investment, and has been referred to as development-friendly.66 The GATS allows
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member states of the WTO to prioritize policy flexibility, by preserving economic
sectors from national treatment and market access obligations.67
Developing countries like India have argued that this does not work in favour of
developing countries because they lack the wherewithal to effectively bargain with
developed countries.68 Alongside this problem, stiff competition among developing
countries for the little foreign direct investment opportunities available is a factor to be
considered. Therefore, developing countries fear that their liberty to determine the
economic sectors they would accommodate foreign direct investment may not yield
positive results where potential investors insist on terms which they do not favour. The
fear of losing potential foreign investors to neighbouring developing countries is a major
consideration for them when they make national treatment and market access decisions.
The above problem may be resolved if developed countries can identify the interests of
potential foreign investors. Developed countries sometimes look upon developing
countries for natural resources which are not so abundant in their home countries. An
example is the oil sector. The United States, for instance, invests heavily in developing
oil producing states like Nigeria and Libya. These states can use their status as oil
67
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producing states, or other natural resource producers, as a bargaining chip when
negotiating for foreign direct investment. They can insist that potential investors in the
oil sector the value of which exceeds a particular sum, must also invest in another
economic sector, which the host state hopes to develop. This would serve as an
investment triggering mechanism to ensure that the agenda of developed foreign
investors match the agenda of developing host states. This way, developing host states
can effectively distribute and regulate foreign direct investment in line with their
domestic policy and agenda. This approach may provide the necessary flexibility
required by host states in the regulation of foreign direct investment, and also allay the
fears of developing countries when they negotiate a multilateral framework for
investment.
Another advantage of the GATS which should be emulated by the multilateral
framework for investment is the market access principle which adopts the positive list
approach at the pre-establishment stage and the national treatment standard at the postestablishment stage of foreign direct investment. Article XVI of GATS prohibits certain
limitations which constitute major obstacles to the admission of foreign direct
investment. However, member states are only bound by this obligation if commitments
have been made in this regard. This approach permits host states to control and regulate
investment at the point of entry, thereby safeguarding their sovereignty. Thus,
propositions by some developed countries like Canada to apply the national treatment
standard at both the pre- and post- establishment stages should not be accepted, as this
would diminish the rights of host states to control the inflow of foreign direct investment.
Also, apart from the NAFTA, no other investment agreement provides for the national
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treatment standard at the pre-establishment stage. Introducing the national treatment
standard at the pre-establishment stage in the multilateral framework for investment
would not only disrupt existing bilateral and multilateral investment treaties; but it will
also delay the process of negotiating a multilateral framework for investment as more
countries will oppose the agreement. Therefore, the national treatment standard should
be included in the multilateral framework for investment but within the limits of the
GATS framework which allows for the positive list approach.
The progressive liberalization technique of the GATS could also be emulated in the
multilateral framework for investment because it would balance rights and obligations
and further reduce or eliminate foreign direct investment barriers.
CONCLUSION
A multilateral agreement on investment is essential to provide a comprehensive
framework for investment, and to protect and ensure predictability in the regulation of
foreign direct investment. Progress in the deliberations towards establishing a
multilateral framework for investment under the auspices of the WTO stalled and was
eventually dropped from the Doha agenda due to the opposing views of developed and
developing countries on the subject. Developed countries advocated for a multilateral
framework for investment to ensure predictability, stability, transparency and protection
for their investments, while developed countries oppose it because they fear that it would
encroach on their right to control and regulate foreign direct investment. To reach a
compromise, the GATS may be a workable model after which to fashion the multilateral
framework for investment.
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The GATS’s aim to liberalise trade in services is evident through the broad principles
and obligations included in it. These range from general obligations, such as mostfavoured-nation and transparency principle, to conditional obligations on domestic
regulation and monopolies. It also provides for specific obligations, including the
national treatment and market access principles. The desire to encourage the
participation of developing countries in securing service liberalization is apparent in the
schedule of specific commitments. The GATS obligations play different roles to ensure
eradication or limitation of barriers to trade in services, including the regulation of
foreign direct investment.
The analysis of this chapter demonstrates that the GATS has contributed to the expansion
of trade in services and its liberalization in an effective manner. Its flexibility provisions
for host states help to preserve their desired power and control over their economic
growth and development policies. The Doha development round had similar purposes on
its agenda on the relationship between trade and investment. The overall agenda of the
Doha Round is to reduce trade barriers and liberalise international trade. It aimed to
pursue the needs and interests of developing countries by making efforts to ensure that
developing countries and least-developed countries “secure a share in the growth of
world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development”.69 The GATS
has, to some extent, been successful in achieving these goals, particularly regarding the
regulation of investment.
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A number of the GATS’ rules, especially the provision on host state flexibility, should be
incorporated in the multilateral framework for investment. This recommendation already
has support from numerous developed and developing countries as previously discussed
in chapter 3.70 Although the GATS may not be perfect, its provision on the regulation of
foreign direct investment may provide a platform on which prospective multilateral
investment agreements can be modelled. Perhaps, similar positive results as enunciated
above would be achieved.71 This would, at least, provide a structure for the multilateral
framework for investment which may be later modified through progressive
liberalization.

70

See pages 10-25 of Chapter 3.

71

See pages 24-28 of this Chapter.
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CHAPTER 5:

CONCLUSION

This thesis has discussed and analyzed the need for a multilateral framework for
investment, setting out its benefits and possible disadvantages as well as the challenges
to negotiation and implementation. It has sought to demonstrate that the national
treatment standard should be included in the multilateral framework for investment, but
that its scope should be limited to specific economic sectors to which members permit its
application as exemplified in GATS. In this way, both the needs of developed and
developing countries, and the positive and negative effects of the multilateral framework
for investment on the economies of developing countries can be balanced.
The quest for a multilateral framework for investment has been the subject of negotiation
since 1948, when negotiations for the Havana Charter was unsuccessful. Further attempts
made through different institutions and Conventions such as, the Shawcross Draft
Convention, the OECD, the UNCTC, the World Bank and the WTO, show that the
regulation of foreign direct investment is vital to economic development and growth.
The major stumbling block to the establishment of a multilateral Agreement has been the
lack of agreement between developed and developing countries on the subject. The scope
of such an Agreement, particularly the inclusion of the national treatment standard, has
been one of the main subjects of disagreement. This divergence of opinion dates back to
the disputes between Latin America states and the United States on the appropriate
treatment of foreign investors in the 1800s’. Since that time, developed countries have
been persistent in their demand for a minimum international standard for the treatment of
foreign investors. This was rejected by the Latin Americans who favoured the
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application of the Calvo doctrine which, today, is exemplified by the “national treatment
standard”.
Ironically, negotiating positions in this regard have come to a full-circle and suggestions
by developed countries to expand the scope of obligations, to include the national
treatment standard in the multilateral framework for investment, are now opposed by
developing countries. Developing countries fear that uncontrolled national treatment
rights would limit their desire to preserve policy space and protect their domestic
industries. This disagreement has stalled progress in attempts to create a multilateral
framework for investment.
The most recent attempt, which ceased in 2004 to create a multilateral framework for
investment was sought under the auspices of the WTO in 1996 because of its previous
success in the establishment of multilateral agreements. The WTO is seen as an ideal
venue for this negotiation. However, the age-long controversy on the scope of foreign
direct investment regulation has remained constant.
One element of the controversy is the differing opinions regarding the inclusion of the
national treatment standard in the multilateral framework for investment. This became
apparent during the Doha Development Round held in 2001 when a working group was
set up to examine the relationship between trade and investment. The implications of a
multilateral framework for investment are viewed differently by developed and
developing countries. The developed countries, led by the European Community and the
United States, expressed the view that including the national treatment standard in the
multilateral framework for investment will increase foreign direct investment flows,
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ensure transparency and provide the necessary stability and security for foreign
investment. Developing countries, on the other hand, argued that uncontrolled foreign
direct investment, facilitated through national treatment, would stall their economic
growth and deprive them of the right to control the inflow of foreign direct investment.
These conflicting views form the foundation of the analysis provided in this work as to
its acceptability within a multilateral framework for investment framework for the
regulation of foreign direct investment.
The analysis of this thesis has shown that despite the controversies relating to the need
for a multilateral framework for investment, developed and developing countries share
the view: that the multilateral framework for investment is necessary to ensure security,
stability, predictability and transparency in the regulation of foreign transactions as
required by the investor states. The disagreement relates to the scope of obligations of
the multilateral framework for investment. Developing countries, as likely host states,
fear that the advantages of the multilateral framework for investment are accompanied
by potential harmful economic consequences if the right to regulate the inflow of foreign
direct investment is not retained. However, this analysis has demonstrated that this fear
can be allayed if the multilateral framework for investment is designed to accommodate
the desire of developing countries to retain control over the inflow of foreign direct
investment, which would provide host countries with the necessary flexibility to
determine the level of foreign direct investment to embrace depending on their economic
developmental needs.
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This thesis has shown that a workable model for the successful creation of a multilateral
framework for investment is the GATS. The GATS regulates investment in services
through the commercial presence mode of service supply. Its success in the liberalization
and regulation of trade in services is commendable, and similar feats may be achieved
for investment through the multilateral framework for investment. The GATS obligations
play different roles to ensure eradication or limitation of barriers to trade in services,
including the regulation of foreign direct investment.
The GATS’ positive list approach to the regulation of trade in services through specific
obligations, such as the national treatment and market access principles are worthy of
emulation. The positive list approach provides the necessary flexibility to host states for
the proper regulation of foreign direct investment. This affords host states, particularly
developing countries, the much desired freedom to determine which foreign direct
investment to embrace, and what investment restrictive policies to adopt in order to
safeguard growing domestic companies, thereby, securing national economic growth.
With the exception of India, it is clear that some developing countries are willing to
negotiate a multilateral framework for investment fashioned after the GATS. They
believe that this would further increase the power of developing host states to preserve
their policy spaces and development objectives. Some developing countries have
requested further study and technical assistance to enable them understand the full
implication of the multilateral framework for investment on their economies. This will
enable them to fully understand and appreciate the implications of the multilateral
framework for investment, and how they can employ it to their advantage. It would also
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contribute to strengthening their bargaining power. Also, limiting the application of the
national treatment standard to the post-establishment stage of investment, and not the
pre-investment stage, would further allay the fears of developing countries. The overall
benefits of the GATS’ style are that it would lead to increased competition, increased
market access and predictability and transparency which would accelerate the growth
foreign direct investment.
This thesis concludes that to progress towards establishing a multilateral framework for
investment, the WTO needs to set up a new Working Group on the Relationship between
Trade and Investment which must consider the worries of developing countries and to
balance them against the benefits the multilateral framework for investment would bring.
This can be achieved by modelling the agreement after the GATS. The GATS may not
be the perfect agreement to serve as a template for the multilateral framework for
investment; but it is the most comprehensive agreement on investment under the
auspices of the WTO, and it seems to address the major concerns of developing countries
regarding the regulation of foreign direct investment. With this start, there is room for
progressive liberalization at a later date.
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